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Garfield: State Competence to Regulate Corporate Takeovers: Lessons from St

STATE COMPETENCE TO REGULATE
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: LESSONS FROM
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
Alan E. Garfield*
It... is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country
for States to create corporations,to prescribe theirpowers, and to
define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares.'
One of the more enduring issues in corporate law scholarship is
the question of federalization. 2 Put simply, the question is whether
Congress, exercising its broad authority to regulate interstate com-

merce, 3 should replace the current system of state corporate regulation with a uniform federal system.
Advocates of federalization think such federal intervention necessary because, to their minds, the state law system has produced

laws which favor management interests, and not, as it should, the
interests of shareholders.' Managers, they argue, seek to incorporate

in states with corporate law regimes that favor their own interests;
and states, anxious to win chartering business, have responded to this
* Assistant Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; B.A. Brandeis University, 1979; J.D. University of California at Los Angeles, 1983. The author wishes to thank
John G. Culhane, Donald E. Pease and John D. Wladis, for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
1. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
2. The debate over federalization of corporate law can be traced as far back as James
Madison's proposal at the Constitutional Convention to invest the federal government with the
power "[t]o grant charters of incorporation in cases where the Public good may require them,
and the authority of a single state may be incompetent." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 325 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). For a good historical overview of the
federalization debate, see Boyer, Federalism and CorporationLaw: Drawing the Line in State
Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1986).
3. See Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 571
(1984); Note, Federal Charteringof Corporations:Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J.
123 (1972).
4. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
59 (1976); Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 665-66 (1974).
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demand by engaging in a "race to the bottom," 5 each outdoing the
other in its willingness to allow managers to exploit corporate resources at the shareholders' expense.'
Opponents of federalization, by contrast, believe just the opposite: that the state chartering system has produced laws which maximize shareholder welfare.7 While these scholars concede that managers typically make the decision as to where to incorporate, they
argue that the various markets in which corporations operate compel
managers to use their discretion in the best interests of shareholders.8 Consequently, states competing for chartering business have
been encouraged, in the words of one scholar, to engage in a "climb
to the top." 9
5.

See Cary, supra note 4, at 665. Cary actually used the phrase "race for the bottom."

Id.
6. See generally Cary, supra note 4 (arguing that Delaware law has been historically
favorable to corporate management). Some advocates of federalization are not only concerned
that state corporate laws are promoting management and not shareholder interests, but also
that the laws are not sufficiently sensitive to the concerns of nonshareholder corporate constituencies, such as employees, resident communities, and consumers. See, e.g., R. NADER, M.
GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 252-63. The propriety of addressing these concerns
through corporate law has been addressed by other scholars. See, e.g., Engel, An Approach to
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at
32. See generally Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923
(1984).
7. Winter, State Law, ShareholderProtection,and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J.
LEGAL STUD.

251, 290 (1977). Winter states:

With all due respect both to Professor Cary and to the almost universal academic
support for his position, it is implausible on its face. The plausible argument runs in
the opposite direction: (1) If Delaware permits corporate management to profit at
the expense of shareholders and other states do not, then earnings of Delaware corporations must be less than earnings of comparable corporations chartered in other
states and shares in the Delaware corporations must trade at lower prices. (2) Corporations with lower earnings will be at a disadvantage in raising debt or equity
capital. (3) Corporations at a disadvantage in the capital market will be at a disadvantage in the product market and their share price will decline, thereby creating a
threat of a takeover which may replace management. To avoid this result, corporations must seek out legal systems more attractive to capital. (4) States seeking corporate charters will thus try to provide legal systems which optimize the shareholder-corporation relationship.
Id. at 256; see also Fischel, The "'Raceto the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982).
8. Fischel, supra note 7, at 919; Winter, supra note 7, at 256, 262-73.
9. Fischel, supra note 7, at 920.
Though the debate over federalization would seem to turn on an easily verifiable empirical
question-whether state corporate laws in fact tend to favor management or shareholder interests-a definitive answer to this question has thus far eluded scholars, and the debate therefore
continues. See Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss3/2

2

Garfield: State Competence to Regulate Corporate Takeovers: Lessons from St

STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

This Article seeks to contribute to this larger "federalization"
debate by considering the competence with which states regulate one

particular corporate activity: corporate takeovers. State takeover legislation is particularly suited to such an examination because it has
been one
of the most active areas of corporate lawmaking in recent
s

years, 1 and more importantly, because takeovers themselves are

thought to play a critical role in protecting shareholders against
management abuse.'" How states have chosen to regulate this phe-

nomenon can provide a good indication of whether the chartering
market is promoting management interests or shareholder interests. 2
709, 732-37 (1987) [hereinafter Romano, State Competition] (reviewing empirical studies concerning state competition, and concluding that "to the extent [the studies] can be used
to buttress any position, it is the value-maximizing view associated with Ralph Winter.");
Coffee, The Future of Corporate Federalism:State Competition and the New Trend Toward
De Facto Federal Minimum Standards,8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 767-69 (1987) (questioning
the validity of empirical studies); see also Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
REV.

Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) (testing the opposing views of state

competition for corporate charters with various empirical studies).
Some scholars have further refined the debate concerning state competition for corporate
charters by noting the role which specific state interest groups, and in particular the legal
community, can play in affecting the nature of state corporate laws. See, e.g., Macey &
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469
(1987). Professor Romano has developed an explanation for the market for corporate charters
which considers the effect of transaction costs of reincorporation on the operation of the market. Romano, State Competition, supra, at 717-25.
10. See infra notes 129, 131 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach
to Corporations:The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819
(1981).
12. State takeover regulation has also, perhaps more than any other area of state corporate law, raised the spectre of federalization. Litigators seeking to invalidate such laws have
argued strenuously, and with some success, that federal law already severely limits state corporate lawmaking in this area. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), discussed
infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text. In addition, in recent years Congress has considered
preempting state takeover legislation. See, e.g., Witnesses at Takeover Bill Hearing Split on
Preemption of State Regulation, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 851 (June 12, 1987).
For a sampling of recent literature on state takeover legislation, see Booth, The Promise
of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988); Boyer, supra note 2; Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis.
L REV. 365; Coffee, The Uncertain Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435; Cox, The Constitutional "Dynamics" of
the Internal Affairs Rule-A Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 317 (1988);
Galanti, Developments in Business Associations Law: CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America, 21 IND. L. REV. 1 (1988); Garden, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America:
A State's Right to Tend to Its Tender Offers, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 947 (1988); Grippo, In Defense of State Takeover Laws, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 273 (1988); Langevoort, The Supreme
Court and the Politicsof CorporateTakeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987); Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the
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This Article begins with the premise that federal intervention to

limit state takeover regulation is only justified if the states are not
competently regulating takeovers. States, after all, have longstanding
experience in regulating corporate affairs, and there would seem to

be little reason for the federal government to "fix" this system if it
"ain't broke.' 13
After a brief overview of state takeover legislation in Part I,"

this Article reveals two very different lessons about state competence
to regulate takeovers, with two very different implications for federalization. The first lesson, set forth in Part 11,15 concerns the problem
of protectionism. Put simply, some states are abusing their corporate
lawmaking powers in an effort to stop takeovers of large local
employers.

6

While such protectionist corporate law is admittedly a problem-protectionist legislation has long been considered anathema in
our federal system' 7-- this Article argues that such corporate law

warrants only a limited federal response. Most important, unlike
most corporate law, protectionist legislation is not a product of the
state competition for charters, but rather it occurs because local
lawmakers feel pressured to protect their constituents from out-ofNational Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467; Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 699
(1988); Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law,
41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473 (1987) [hereinafter Pinto, Takeover Statutes]; Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111 (1987); Thompson, Defining the Federal and State Realms of Tender Offer Regulation, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1057 (1986); Weiss, A
Proposalfor a Federal Takeover Law, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1988); Note, The Delaware
Takeover Statute: Constitutionally Infirm Even Under the Market ParticipantException, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 203 (1988) (authored by Ivy B. Dodes); Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited
Defense of State Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (1987) (authored by Steven Gitelman). For some earlier literature on state takeover legislation, see infra
notes 43, 86.
13. There is much to be said for federal deference to state corporate lawmaking. Most
notably, federal intervention into this historic bailiwick of the states might not only prove
disruptive for the corporate community, it could also, not having been tested, easily result in a
worse system. See Fischel, supranote 7, at 921-23 (arguing that "there is no reason to believe,
and every reason to doubt" that federal regulation would increase shareholders' welfare); Romano, State Competition, supra note 9, at 712-13 (suggesting that there is no reason to think
that "diffuse and unorganized" shareholders would be any more capable of communicating
their views to Congress than to state legislatures).
14. See infra notes 25-128 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 129-228 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 136-66 and accompanying text.
17. See Regan, The Supreme Courtand State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (1986); infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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state competition.' 8 The appropriate federal response to such legislation, it is argued, is not to invalidate all state takeover regulation,
but only that which has been tainted by a protectionist motive. Such
limited intervention has been the historic federal response to protectionism through judicial invalidation under the Commerce Clause.19
The second lesson, set forth in Part 111,20 directly addresses the
effectiveness of the state chartering market in regulating takeovers.
While protectionism explains much of the current state takeover legislation, some of the legislation, such as the recently enacted Delaware takeover statute 2 has been clearly enacted in response to the
market for corporate charters.22
This latter legislation, it should be noted, is not protectionist.
Although it is prompted by a desire to protect a state's chartering
industry, it does so not by stopping the flow of commerce out of a
state, but by encouraging it to freely flow in.23 The legislation, instead, must be evaluated in the context of the larger "race to the
bottom" debate. If the chartering market is promoting management
interests rather than shareholder interests, then some form of federal
intervention is needed.
As will be seen, an examination of the Delaware takeover statute suggests that the chartering market has been engaging in a "race
to the bottom"-the legislation appears to be sheltering managers
from hostile takeovers without any credible concomitant benefit to
shareholders.24 The appropriate federal response to this type of takeover legislation is not a piecemeal approach. Absent corrective federal intervention, the chartering market will continue to promote
management entrenchment legislation. This Article argues, however,
that minimal federal intervention may be sufficient to correct any
18. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 229-313 and accompanying text.
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
See infra notes 229, 233 and accompanying text.
23. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 284 (3d ed.
1986). In explaining why a Michigan advertisement campaign promoting Michigan as a vaca-

tion spot is not protectionist, one commentator stated:
[W]e might say that protectionism takes over a market share by force; it is like
acquiring territory by armed conquest. Advertising, like product improvement
[which is arguably what Delaware is doing in revising its corporate laws] and other
standard market ploys, uses no force; it encourages a free transfer of allegiance. It is
like acquiring territory by plebiscite of the inhabitants.
Regan, supra note 17, at 1114.
24. See infra notes 240-52 and accompanying text.
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management bias in the chartering market.
I.

BACKGROUND: OVERVIEW OF STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION

Any overview of state takeover regulation must begin with a
recognition that the legislation has not developed in a vacuum. To
the contrary, the federal government has, through both legislative
and judicial actions, asserted some influence in the takeover
area-influence which has naturally affected the development of the
state regulation.2 5
On the legislative side is the Williams Act, a series of amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 enacted by Congress in 1968.27 The Williams Act, like other federal securities regulations, is for the most part, a disclosure statute. -8 It requires tender
offerors to make disclosures concurrently with their offers, 9 and requires owners of large blocks of stock to file post-acquisition disclosure statements concerning the nature and purpose of their
acquisitions."0
Viewed narrowly, as a statute limited to disclosure requirements, the Williams Act would have little preemptive impact on
state takeover regulation. The legislative history behind the Act,
however, reveals a strong desire on the part of Congress that takeover battles be fought on a level playing field-one that favors

neither management nor acquirors 31-and

an activist court could use

25. For an insightful article concerning the interplay of federal and state law in the
takeover context, see Thompson, supra note 12.
26. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)).
27. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
28. Despite its focus on disclosure, the Williams Act does have more substantive requirements than is typical in securities regulation. The Act, for instance, not only requires that
tender offerors file disclosure statements accompanying their offers, it also sets forth a litany of
rules regarding the timing and nature of offers themselves. For example, §§ 14(d)(5)-(7) of
the Williams Act specify rules concerning shareholder withdrawal rights, the effects of oversubscription in a partial offer, and rules for when an offeror increases its offering price during
the pendency of a tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1982). The Securities and Exchange Commission has used its rulemaking authority to supplement these statutory provisions
with additional substantive regulation. See, e.g., Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1988)
(prescribing a minimum tender offer period); Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1988)
(setting forth tender offer regulations assuring equal treatment of security holders within the
same class).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
30. Id. § 78m(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
31. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1982); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975).
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this history to preempt any state legislation which itself did not
adopt a neutral stance in takeover battles.32 In Edgar v. MITE
Corp.,33 the Supreme Court's first major encounter with state takeover legislation,3 4 three Justices endorsed such a broad reading of the
Williams Act.35 More recently, however, in CTS Corp. v Dynamics
Corp. of America,36 the Court, in its second encounter with takeover
legislation, largely retreated from this position."
State regulation of takeovers has also been influenced by what
might be called "federal judicial intervention." This term is used to
mean judicial use of dormant Commerce Clause theories to limit
state takeover regulation,3 8 rather than judicial construction of the
Williams Act, which is ultimately simply a matter of construing
Congressional intent. As will be seen, the Court's application of

Commerce Clause doctrines to state takeover legislation has paralleled its treatment of the Williams Act. At first, the Court in MITE
broadly applied the Commerce Clause so as to severely restrict state

lawmaking powers in the takeover context. 9 In the subsequent CTS
decision, however, the Court largely retreated from this position. 0
This ebb and flow of federal intervention into the takeover arena
has only helped to heighten the importance of the question addressed
in this Article-what state takeover regulation teaches about the
competence of states to regulate corporate takeovers, and the need, if
any, for federal intervention. The MITE decision, which represented
32. As the Court noted in MITE, a state statute will be preempted by federal legislation
when the state "'law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.'" MITE, 457 U.S. at 631 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
33. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
34. Actually, the Supreme Court had an earlier opportunity to rule on a state takeover
statute in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979), but the Court disposed
of the case on procedural grounds.
35. MITE, 457 U.S. at 630-40; see infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing
the preemption leg of the MITE opinion).
36. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
37. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption leg of the
CTS opinion).
38. Although the Commerce Clause simply provides Congress with the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, "it has been
settled for more than a century that the Clause prohibits States from taking certain actions
respecting interstate commerce even absent congressional action." CTS, 481 U.S. at 87 (citing
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)).
39. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Commerce Clause leg
of the MITE opinion).
40. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Commerce Clause leg
of the CTS opinion).
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the pinnacle of federal intervention into the takeover arena, caused a
radical reorientation of state takeover laws from laws which tended
to be more like securities or blue sky laws to laws which more clearly

resembled traditional state corporate law.4 The more recent CTS
decision, which upheld one of these new statutes, squarely posed the
question of whether Congress, in light of the Court's unwillingness to
strike the new regulation, should now intervene.
The overview of state takeover legislation proceeds chronologi-

cally, beginning with "first generation" statutes-those statutes enacted prior to the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, and continuing with "second generation" statutes-those enacted in response to
MITE.
A.

State Takeover Regulation in the Pre-MITE Period: The
"First Generation"
1. First Generation Takeover Statutes.-

Between 1968 and

1982, the year of the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp.,4

thirty-seven states enacted what have become known as

"first generation" takeover statutes.43 These statutes, for the most
part, were imitations of the federal Williams Act.44 Like the Williams Act, the state legislation established disclosure requirements

for tender offers. 45 Many, in fact, required offerors to disclose essentially the same information required by the Williams Act, though
they most typically added at least some additional disclosure items.46
The state legislation, however, also typically had some signifi41. See infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
42. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
43. For a list of first generation statutes, see Sargent, On the Validity ofState Takeover
Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIo ST. LJ. 689, 690 n.7 (1981);
Comment, Illinois' New Second Generation, Second Step Takeover Amendment: Continuing
The Trend of States' Takeover Regulations, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 87, 88 n.17 (1987)
(authored by Valerie Ann Hall). See generally Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinningsof Takeover Legislation,36 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 733 (1979); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977).
44. Sargent, Do the Second-GenerationState Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 3, 3-4 (1984).
45. Langevoort, supra note 43, at 226-33.

46. See

S. PAMEPINTO,

CAN

STATES

STOP

CORPORATE TAKEOVERS

3 (1987);

Langevoort, supra note 43, at 229; Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L.
REV. 687 (1975); Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat,
Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 3, 8 n.28 (1984); Wilner & Landy,
The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,45 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 8 (1976).
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cant differences from the Williams Act--differences which for the
most part, tended to increase the legislation's anti-takeover effect.
Many of the state statutes, for instance, required offerors to file their
disclosure statements far in advance of making their offers,47 thus
providing managers with lead time to implement defensive tactics to
thwart unwelcome offers. 8 The Williams Act, by contrast, requires
only that disclosures be made simultaneously with offers.49
Similarly, many state acts authorized state officials to conduct
lengthy public hearings on the adequacy of an offeror's disclosures,50
hearings which, again, had the effect of greatly delaying the offering
process. 51 By contrast, the Williams Act contains no provision for
public hearings on the adequacy of the disclosure documents.
Finally, many of the state acts also authorized state officials to
review offers for their substantive fairness to shareholders. 2 This
was a requirement wholly absent in the Williams Act, which, according to the legislative history, was intended to leave the decision
of fairness to the shareholder/offerees. 53
It is also worth noting that the state legislation, to the extent it
can be considered a form of corporate law, frequently had peculiar
jurisdictional limits. Unlike most corporate law statutes which usually apply to entities incorporated in the legislating state, the acts
often applied to offers for foreign corporations if the corporations
had a substantial presence in the state, such as substantial assets,
their principal place of business, or a large number of shareholders. 4

§

47. See Langevoort, supra note 43, at 226-28; Profusek & Gompf, supra note 46, at 7.
48. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-36 (1982) (plurality opinion).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982). In 1980, the SEC adopted Rule 14d-2, 17 C.F.R.
240.14d-2 (1988), which provides that a bidder's public announcement of certain material

terms of an offer will constitute the commencement of a tender offer, thus subjecting the party
to the disclosure and timing requirements of the Williams Act. See id. Since a bidder's disclosure pursuant to a state takeover statute would, in most cases, constitute the commencement of
a tender offer under this rule, the pre-registration waiting periods of the state statutes, which

precluded bidders from commencing their offers until the end of the waiting period, made it
impossible for bidders to comply with both state and federal schemes. The SEC recognized
that it was creating this conflict in adopting Rule 14d-2 and openly acknowledged that its

intent was to preempt state laws. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326, 77,329-30 (1979), 17 C.F.R.

§

240.14d-2 (1988).
50. See Boehm, supra note 43, at 733; Langevoort, supra note 43, at 232; Profusek &
Gompf, supra note 46, at 7-8.
51. See, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 636-39.
52. See Langevoort, supra note 43, at 232; Note, The Tender Offer Regulation Battle
Continues: Should States Regulate Only Local Companies?, 60 IND. L.J. 721, 727 (1985)
(authored by Phyllis E. Grimm).
IHTE, 457 U.S. at 639-40.
53.
54. See Boehm, supra note 43, at 738; Langevoort, supra note 43, at 219-20; Profusek
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In theory, the purpose of these statutes, like the Williams Act,
was to protect shareholders by insuring that the shareholders, when

confronted by a tender offer, had adequate information so as to
make an informed decision as to whether to tender.5 5 Ostensibly, in
fact, the first generation statutes even surpassed the Williams Act in

terms of their solicitude for shareholders-not only did the statutes
require offerors to make disclosures (and many required offerors to
disclose even more information than that required by the Williams
Act), 56 they also authorized state officials to independently evaluate

offers for their "fairness" to shareholders. 7
2. Edgar v. MITE Corp.: The Death Knell for First Generation
Statutes.- Edgarv. MITE Corp.58 was the death knell for first gen-

eration statutes.5 9 In a highly fractionalized decision, five Justices of

the Supreme Court held an Illinois first generation statute was unconstitutional since it was an unlawful burden on interstate commerce.6 0 By implication, MITE portended the demise of all first generation statutes. It also caused a radical reorientation in subsequent
state takeover regulation.

The Illinois statute at issue in MITE"1 was a typical first generation statute. It required tender offerors to file a disclosure statement
& Gompf, supra note 46, at 7.
55. See Langevoort, supra note 43, at 214-16. The Supreme Court has said of the Williams Act: "The legislative history thus shows that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was
the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)
(noting that the act's purpose is to protect public shareholders who are confronted with a cash
tender offer).
56. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
59. See Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "'SecondGeneration",13
SEC. REG. L.J. 332, 332 (1986); Profusek & Gompf, supra note 46, at 3.
60. In essence, Justice White wrote a lead opinion with a smorgasbord of theories for
invalidating the Illinois Act, and the remaining Justices, with the exception of three who dissented on procedural grounds, picked and chose those theories with which they concurred.
Justice Burger and Blackmun joined in Justice White's argument that the Illinois Act was
preempted by the Williams Act. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 625-40. Justices Burger, Stevens and
O'Connor joined in Justice White's argument that the Illinois Act was an unconstitutional
"direct" regulation of interstate commerce. See id. at 625, 640-43. The only theory to garner
an additional four votes (Burger, Stevens, O'Connor and Powell), and thus achieve a slim five
vote majority, was that the Illinois statute was an unconstitutional "indirect" burden on interstate commerce. See id. at 625, 643-46.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, dissented on procedural
grounds. See id. at 655 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , paras. 137.51-137.70
(1979) (repealed 1983).
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with the Illinois Secretary of State twenty days prior to making an

offer,62 and commanded the Secretary to evaluate the statement for
accuracy as well as to rule on the offer's substantive fairness.63

Three Justices found the Illinois Act to be preempted by the

Williams Act.64 The statute, these Justices believed, upset the "care-

ful balance" struck in the Williams Act because its provisions for
pre-offer registration6 and potentially indefinite public hearings66
delayed the offering process and thus tipped the balance in takeover
67
battles in favor of management.
The only theory to gain a majority of the Court, however, was
that the Illinois Act placed an unlawful burden on interstate commerce.68 Applying the balancing test articulated by the Court in
62. The Act provided that any takeover offer for a target company, as defined by the
Act, must be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State. Id. para. 137.54.A. An offer did
not become "registered" until 20 days after a registration statement was filed (and possibly
longer if the Secretary were to call for a hearing). Id. para. 137.54E.
63. See id. para. 137.57E. The plurality opinion in MITE noted:
If the Secretary does hold a hearing, he is directed by the statute to deny registration to a tender offer if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair disclosure to
the offerees of all material information concerning the take-over offer, or that the
take-over offer is inequitable or would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon
the offerees ......
MITE, 457 U.S. at 627 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.57E (1979) (repealed
1983)).
64. See supra note 60.
65. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634-35. The Court stated:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that by providing the target company with
additional time within which to take steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful tool to
combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the stockholders who will not have
an offer before them during this period. These consequences are precisely what Congress determined should be avoided, and for this reason, the precommencement notification provision frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act.
Id. at 635 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 636-39. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals "that the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into
the tender offer process." Id. at 637.
67. Justice White, joined by Justices Burger and Blackmun, specifically noted in a footnote that "[d]elay has been characterized as 'the most potent weapon in a tender-offer fight',"
id. at 637 n.12 (quoting Langevoort, supra note 43, at 238), and listed in another footnote
potential defensive tactics which can be employed by incumbent management in the event of a
delayed offer. Id. at 638 n.13.
These Justices also found the provision in the Illinois Act granting the Secretary of State
the right to rule on the substantive fairness of an offer to be in conflict with the purpose of the
Williams Act. Id. at 639. Looking to the legislative history of the Williams Act, the Justices
concluded that "Congress intended for investors to be free to make their own decisions." Id.
68. Id. at 625, 643-46. The Court's Commerce Clause analysis curiously revived the
distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence between direct and indirect regulation of com-
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Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,69 the Court found the Illinois Act to be
unconstitutional because the burden it placed on interstate commerce far exceeded any purported state interests furthered by the
70

legislation.
On the burden side of the scale, the majority seemed to assume
that an unimpeded market for corporate control was itself an important value embodied in interstate commerce, and the Illinois Act imposed a substantial burden on this market. 71 Citing to the leading
advocates of an open market for corporate control, 72 the Court lamented how the Illinois Act, by authorizing a state official to enjoin
nationwide tender offers, would deprive shareholders "of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium, ' 73 hinder the "reallocation
of economic resources to their highest valued use,"' and reduce the

'75
incentive for "incumbent management to perform well."
On the opposite side of the scale, the Court found virtually
nothing to weigh in the statute's favor. 6 Illinois, for its part, claimed
that the Act was intended to further the state's interests in protecting local shareholders 77 and in regulating the internal affairs of Illi-

merce, see id. at 640-46, a distinction which had long been abandoned by the Court as conclusory and unhelpful. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5, at 408 (2d ed.
1988) (noting that the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" regulation was "rejected as
overly conclusory and misleadingly precise."); Regan, supra note 17, at 1280 (stating that
Justice White's opinion in MITE could "hardly mean to revive the old direct/indirect test in
all its generality.").
Four Justices found the Illinois Act to be automatically unconstituional as a "direct"
regulation on interstate commerce. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643. The majority, however, found the
act to be an unlawful "indirect" regulation, applying to this regulation the Pike balancing test
traditionally used in Commerce Clause cases. See id. at 625, 643-46; see also infra note 69
(discussing the Pike balancing test).
69. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Pike decision establishes the following test for evaluating state legislation under the Commerce Clause: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
70. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-46.
71. Id. at 643.
72. See id. at 643-44 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Marketfor Corporate Control, and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978)).
73. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 644-46.
77. Id. at 644.
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nois corporations.

8

Upon examining the Act's jurisdictional limits,

however, the Court found both of these claims to be specious.7 9 The
Act applied to offers for corporations that had either ten percent of
their equity securities owned by Illinois residents, or met any two of
the following three requirements: (1) the corporation had its principal executive office in Illinois; (2) was incorporated in Illinois; or (3)
had at least ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus in
Illinois8 0 With these limits in mind, the Court found that the Illinois
Act did little to further either the state's interests in protecting resident shareholders, since it could apply to offers for companies that
did not have a single Illinois shareholder, 81 or its interest in regulating the internal affairs of domestic corporations, since it potentially
applied to offers for foreign corporations. 2
Moreover, the Court noted that the statute did not even regulate internal corporate affairs, which the Court described as "matters
peculiar to the relationships among or between [a] corporation and
I Instead, the
its current officers, directors, and shareholders . *S...
Illinois Act attempted to regulate transfers of stock between share78. Id. at 645.
79. Id. at 644-46.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1, para. 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed 1983); see also MITE,
457 U.S. at 627 (discussing the provisions of the Illinois Act).
81. The Court stated: "While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders." MITE,
457 U.S. at 644. Earlier in its decision, the Court had noted that the Illinois Act
would apply even if not a single one of [the target's] shareholders were a resident of
Illinois, since the Act applies to every tender offer for a corporation meeting two of
the following conditions: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois,
is organized under Illinois laws, or has at least 10% of its stated captial and paid-in
surplus represented in Illinois.
Id. at 642.
The Court also expressed disbelief that the Illinois Act was intended to protect shareholders. See id. at 644-45. The Act, for instance, exempted from its requirements company selftenders, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.52-9(4) (1979) (repealed 1983), even though
shareholders would seem to be in equal need of the Act's protection in that context. As the
Court noted, "[tihis distinction is at variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and
tends to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the statute imposes on interstate
commerce." MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
Finally, the Court also expressed doubt that the disclosure and substantive provisions in
the Illinois Act "substantially enchance[d]" shareholder protection since many of the provisions duplicated regulations already found in the federal Williams Act. Id. at 644-45.
82. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46. The Court asserted, "[tihe Act thus applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have their principal place of business in other
States. Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations." Id.
83. Id. at 645.
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holders and wholly independent third party buyers.84
B.

State Takeover Regulation After MITE: The "Second
Generation"

MITE represents the federal government's furthest incursion

into state corporate lawmaking in the takeover context. Read
broadly, the Court's Commerce Clause analysis suggests that any
state law which interferes with the market for corporate control was
potentially unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court's plurality preemption analysis suggests that any state legislation which tips the balance in takeover battles in favor of management would be preempted

by the Williams Act. 85
MITE did not, however, stop state takeover regulation. It only
changed its direction. States responded to the Court's criticism that
the Illinois Act did not regulate "internal corporate affairs" by devising new statutes which more clearly resembled traditional corporate
laws. The result was a variety of statutes, the most prevalent of
which focused on such traditional corporate law issues as mergers,
appraisal rights, shareholder voting rights and the fiduciary obligations of corporate managers.
1. The Array of Second Generation Statutes.- Six types of second generation statutes are notable.86 They are best classified by

84. Id.
85. The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.,
794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), reflects the height of judicial hostility
to state takeover legislation. In that decision, Judge Posner, writing for the court, gave what
might have been the broadest interpretation of MITE. Id. In his preemption analysis, for instance, he described the reasoning of the MITE plurality as follows:
Of course it is a big leap from saying that the Williams Act does not itself exhibit
much hostility to tender offers to saying that it implicitly forbids states to adopt
more hostile regulations, but this leap was taken by the Supreme Court plurality
and us in MITE and by every court to consider the question since.
Id. at 262. Judge Posner's Commerce Clause discussion also spoke in broad language about
the limits placed on state takeover regulation by the Commerce Clause:
The commerce clause does not allow states to prevent corporations from moving
assets and employees to other states. But whether or not an anti-takeover statute is
vulnerable to challenge under the commerce clause if it impedes mobility of corporate assets, it is highly vulnerable if it impedes the important commerce in corporate
control. Even if a corporation's tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with
which they are employed and the proportions in which the earnings they generate
are divided between management and shareholders depends on the market for corporate control-an interstate, indeed international, market that [a state] is not authorized to opt out of ....
Id. at 264.
86. For discussion of second generation statutes, see generally Block, Barton & Roth,
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what they purport to do.
Three second generation statutes-fair price, control share
cash-out and control share acquisition-purport to protect target
shareholders from the coercive effects of two-tiered tender offers."

Such offers occur when an acquiror announces that it will pay a high
price for shares tendered into a front-end tender offer, while simultaneously threatening to pay a lesser amount to shareholders squeezed
out in a subsequent merger. Tender offers of this type are thought to
force shareholders to accept the initial offer for fear of being caught
in the disadvantageous back-end."8
Fair price statutes, originally developed by Maryland, 9 relieve
shareholders from the pressure of two-tiered offers by requiring that
any shareholders squeezed out in a second-step merger receive essentially the same price (a "fair price") as that received by the shareholders who tendered into the front-end of the offer. 90
supra note 59; Garrity, Addendum: Post-MITE State Takeover Statutes: Constitutional Issues and Recent Cases, 42 Bus. LAW. 586 (1987); Profusek & Gompf, supra note 46; Sargent,
supra note 44; Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to State Takeover Legislation
After MITE, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 473 (1984); Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671 (1985).
87. See Note, The Constitutionalityof Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REV. 203, 222 (1987) (authored by James R. Pagano).
88. See generally Booth, supra note 12, at 1640-43; Carney, Shareholder Coordination
Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983
Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341, 347-53; Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1987); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile
Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 307-09 (1983); Note, Second
Step Transactions in Two-Tiered Takeovers: The Case for State Regulation, 19 GA. L. REV.
343 (1985) (authored by Robert Owen Ball III). Some scholars have questioned whether twotiered offers are actually harmful to shareholders. See, e.g., Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers
and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV. 281 (1985).
89. MD. CORPS. & ASSN'S CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1988). See
generally Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New
Tack, 83 MICH. L. REV. 433 (1984). Other states with fair price statutes include: Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West 1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
607.108 (West Supp. 1989); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to -235 (Supp. 1988);
Illinois, ILL, ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Kentucky, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396-.398 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12:132-:134 (West Supp. 1989); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1776.1784 (West Supp. 1989); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to -7 (Supp. 1988); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -79 (Supp. 1988); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §9 13.1725 to -727.1 (1989); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1989); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1988).
90. See Sargent, Do Second-GenerationState Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause? A PreliminaryInquiry, in TENDER OFFERS 75, 82 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985) (stating
that "the [Maryland fair price] statute is designed to inhibit front-end-loaded, two-step takeovers, on the ground that such takeover bids are inherently coercive and unfair to nontendering
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Control share cash-out statutes, first developed by Pennsylvania,9 1

basically achieve the same result by giving to shareholders a

right of redemption against anyone who acquires more than a certain
percentage of the company's stock.92 Shareholders are typically al-

lowed to redeem their shares for a fair value which takes into
consid93
eration any premium paid by the acquiror to gain control.
Finally, control share acquisition statutes, first developed by
Ohio,94 require offerors to receive shareholder approval before passshareholders."); Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 MD. L. REV. 266, 272-73 (1984). Scriggins and Clarke state that the Maryland fair
price statute
provides that when the second step of a takeover involves a forcing transaction using
state law voting provisions (i.e., when there is a merger or similar transaction with
an interested stockholder), the second transaction is subject to a higher vote than is
usually required unless the price paid in the second transaction is as high as the
price paid in the first step of the takeover bid.
Id.; see also Note, supra note 88, at 384 (noting that the Maryland Act requires that the
purchase be made at a value at least as high as the front-end price).
Acquirors can typically avoid the fair price requirement if a supermajority of the share-

holders (such as 80%) and the minority shareholders approve the cash-out transaction. See
generally Prentice, The Role of States in Tender Offers: An Analysis of CTS, 1988 COLUM
Bus. L. REV. 1, 27; Sargent, supra, at 82.
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Another state with a control
share cash-out statute is Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1988). See
generally S. PAMEPINTO, supra note 46, at 14 (listing the states with control share cash-out
statutes and the years they were enacted).
92. Under the Pennsylvania Act, for ihstance, the statute is triggered when an acquiror
obtains 20% or more of the voting shares of a company covered by the Act. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1910(B)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
93. See S. PAMEPINTO, supra note 46, at 18; Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania
Shareholder ProtectionAct: A New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids,
40 Bus. LAW. 111, 115 (1984); Note, supra note 88, at 380.
94. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson 1985). See generally Note, Has Ohio
Avoided the Wake of MITE? An Analysis of the Constitutionalityof the Ohio Control Share
Acquisition Act, 46 OHIo ST. L.1 203 (1985) (authored by Katherine B. Raup). Other states
with control share acquisition statutes include: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to
-1217 (Supp. 1988); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.109-.110 (West Supp. 1989); Hawaii,
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 415-171 to -172 (1985 & Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 231-42-1 to -11 (West 1989); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135-:140.2 (West Supp.
1989); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 1IOD, I 10E (West Supp. 1989); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1989); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT § 351.407
(Vernon Supp. 1989); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. 8§21-2431 to -2453 (Supp. 1988); Nevada,
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.378-.3793 (Michie Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 55-90 to -98.1 (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155
(West Supp. 1989); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-101 to -111 (Law. Co-op. Supp.

1988); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-301 to -312 (1988); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 61-6-1 to -12 (Supp. 1988); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1988).
See generally Axley, Stein & McCune, Control Share Statutes, 8 N. ILL. U.L.

REV.

237

(1988).
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ing certain levels of share ownership. 95 These statutes relieve shareholders of the pressures associated with two-tiered offers by allowing
shareholders to decide collectively, before responding to the initial
offer, whether the offer combined with a potential back-end price is
adequate.9 6
A fourth kind of second generation statute, the modified disclosure statute, is also purportedly aimed at protecting shareholders.
These statutes are similar to pre-MITE statutes, but have been modified in an attempt to correct the constitutional infirmities of the earlier legislation.9 7 Minnesota, for instance, adopted a new disclosure
statute that more clearly emphasizes the state's interest in protecting
local shareholders than did most first generation statutes. 98

Finally, two types of second generation statutes do not purport
to protect shareholders, but rather employees and communities from
the dislocative effects of takeovers. Business combination statutes,
first developed by New York, 9 generally provide that acquirors who
95. Hook, What is Wrong with Takeover Legislation, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 293, 318
(1988). Failure to receive shareholder approval may bar the acquiror from purchasing the
additional shares, as is apparently the case with the Ohio statute, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
1701.831 (Anderson 1985), or may simply deny the acquiror voting rights in the acquired
stock, as is the case with the Indiana Act, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 to -I1 (West 1989).
See Hook, supra, at 318-19.
96. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 82-83 (1987). See generally
Booth, supra note 12, at 1681-99 (calling control share statutes, standing alone, "a remarkably
intelligent approach to the problem of fairness in tender offers" and setting forth their merits).
97. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -11 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01.13 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
98. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). As originally
drafted, the Minnesota Act only applied if 20% of the target's equity shares were held by
Minnesota residents and any injunction issued under the statute only enjoined an offeror from
buying from the Minnesota shareholders. Id. §§ 80B.01(8), 80B.01(9), 80B.03(5) (1986).
Though modified disclosure statutes sometimes require an offeror to disclose information
concerning the potential impact of its acquisition on a state's employees, the legislation still
appears to be intended primarily for the benefit of shareholders who will presumably consider
such information in making their decision whether to tender. As the Eighth Circuit said in
upholding the modified Minnesota statute:
While the state may not use the statute as a protectionist measure, it may require
the offeror to inform Minnesota stockholders as to the impacts on the state or its
residents of the takeover, so that they can consider these factors as an element in
their decision to retain their stock or to sell it.
Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 912 (8th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
99. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989). Other states with
business combination statutes include: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to -1223
(Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND, CODE ANN. § 23-1-43-1 to -24 (West 1989); Kentucky, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396-.399 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1989); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp.
1989); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:IOA-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1989); Washington,
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pass a certain level of share ownership without first getting the approval of a target company's board of directors are forbidden from
engaging in any "business combination" with the target, such as a
merger, for a certain period of years.'
Governor Cuomo's memorandum in support of the original New
York statute suggests that the primary purpose of the legislation was
to protect employees and communities from the dislocative effects
associated with highly leveraged takeovers. 1 1 The effect of the business combinations statute, the memorandum states, will be "to encourage a potential acquiror to negotiate its proposed acquisition
with the board of directors" 102 and thus help insure that the "offeror
[will] be more likely to have a commitment to the long-term interests of the resident domestic corporation and its employees."' 0 3 Curiously, as will be discussed later, when Delaware recently enacted a
modified version of the New York statute, 04 the proponents of the
legislation claimed that its primary purpose was to protect shareWASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§

23A.50.010-.900 (Supp. 1989). Delaware has also recently adopted

a business combination statute,

DEL CODE ANN.

tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988), discussed infra

notes 231-93 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to -1223 (Supp. 1988) (providing a
three-year moratorium); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1701 to -1709 (Supp. 1989) (providing a threeyear moratorium); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43-1 to -24 (West 1989) (providing a five-year
moratorium); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396-.399 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988)
(providing a five-year moratorium); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1989) (providing a five-year moratorium); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (providing a

five-year moratorium); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10A-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1989) (providing a
five-year moratorium); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989) (providing a five-year moratorium); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.50.010-.900 (Supp. 1989) (providing a five-year moratorium).
101. See MEMORANDUM TO GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL, 1985 EXTRAORDINARY SESSION, at 6 [hereinafter CuoMo MEMORANDUM] (stating that highly leveraged takeovers "adversely affect employees and communities.... [and] restrict the ability of affected businesses
to grow, to invest for long-term return and to provide increased productivity and
employment.").
Part of the Act is more clearly focused on shareholder concerns. The Act, for instance,
provides that any merger or other business combination conducted after the five year waiting
period must receive approval of a majority of the disinterested shareholders-otherwise, the
acquiror may engage in the transaction only if it pays the minority shareholders a statutorily
fixed fair price. Id. at 2. On the other hand, the Act at times seems openly adverse to shareholder interests, intending to restrain shareholder activity for the purpose of protecting nonshareholder corporate constituencies such as employees and communities. The Governor's
memorandum, for instance, describes how the troublesome leveraged takeovers are fueled, in
part, by "institutional investors" who "have a strong incentive to focus on short-term portfolio
performance rather than long-term investment." Id. at 7.
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id. at 9.
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
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holders from coercive offers.' 0 5
Furthermore, some states have made explicit in their corporate

codes that officers and directors may consider the interests of employees, communities and other nonshareholder corporate constituen-

cies in making decisions, including decisions about how to respond to
a takeover bid.' 06

Finally, it should also be noted that, like their first generation
predecessors, second generation statutes in many instances are triggered by acquisitions of companies not incorporated in the legislating
state, but which have a substantial presence in the state, such as the
principal place of business or a large number of employees.' 0 7
105.
106.

See infra text accompanying note 263.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp.
1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §
8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988). The Pennsylvania statute is exemplary:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, committees of the board, individual directors may, in considering the best interests of
the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees, upon suppliers
and customers of the corporation and upon communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located, and all other pertinent factors. The
consideration of those factors shall not constitute a violation of [the director's fiduciary relation to the corporation].
Id. See generally Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisalof Current Regulation of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 717-18, 732-39 (1984) (discussing the relevance of nonshareholder constituencies and alternative means to protect them); Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations:Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 798-811 (1986)
(discussing management discretion to consider the interests of noninvestor corporate constituents); Lipton, supra note 88, at 41-42 (calling for clarification of the expanded responsibility
of management in the "age of finance corporatism"); Sussman & Sussman, Takeover Cases
Eye Non-Stockholder Interests, Legal Times, Apr. 28, 1986, at 24 (examining whether directors can take into consideration the interests of employees, customers or communities when
dealing with takeover threats).
107. Examples of control share acquisition statutes that apply to foreign corporations
include: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109-.110 (West Supp. 1989) (applying to companies which
have been granted authority to conduct business in Florida; have 100 or more shareholders;
have their principal place of business, principal office or substantial assets within Florida; employ more than 500 Florida residents; and either (a) more than 10% of their shareholders
resident in Florida, (b) more than 10% of their share owned by Florida residents or (c) more
than 1000 shareholders in Florida); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. chs. 110D, 1IOE (West Supp.
1989) (applying to companies with 200 or more stockholders; their principal executive office in
Massachusetts and more of their employees or assets in Massachusetts than in any other state
as of the end of any of the preceding four fiscal quarters; and either (a) more than 10% of
their shareholders resident in Massachusetts or (b) more than 10% of their stock owned by
Massachusetts residents); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to -98.1 (Supp. 1988) (applying to companies with, at the end of each of the last two fiscal years, over 40% of their fixed United
States assets in North Carolina and 40% of their United States employees in North Carolina;
over 500 shareholders; their principal place of business or principal office in North Carolina;
and either (a) more than 10% of their shareholders resident in North Carolina or (b) more

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:535

2. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: Giving New Life

to State Takeover Regulation.- In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America,10 8 the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana control share
acquisition statute. 10 9 While purporting to follow its earlier decision
in MITE, the Court actually signalled a retreat from that decision's
broad federal encroachment into state corporate law.110 CTS, in fact,
than 10% of their shares owned by North Carolina residents); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§
1145-1155 (West Supp. 1989) (declared unconstitutional in TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (applying to companies with 100 or more shareholders; their principal place of business, principal office or substantial assets in Oklahoma;
and either (a) more than 10% of their shares owned by Oklahoma residents, (b) more than
10% of their shareholders resident in Oklahoma, or (c) 10,000 shareholders resident in
Oklahoma).
Examples of fair price statutes which apply to foreign corporations include: FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.108 (West Supp. 1989) (employing nexus requirements similar to those for the
state's control share acquisition statute discussed above); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -79
(Supp. 1988) (employing nexus requirements similar to those for the state's control share acquisition statute discussed above).
For an extended discussion of state takeover statutes which apply to foreign corporations,
see Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations, 23 WAKE
FOREST

L.

REV.

77 (1988).

108. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
109. Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-I to -I1 (West 1989).
110. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 337-38 (suggesting that CTS can be read as confining MITE to "questions of extraterritoriality and incompatible state regulation .... "). The
issues of extraterritoriality and incompatible state regulatutory regimes were raised by the
MITE statute because the statute potentially applied to foreign corporations. See Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion). As a result, if the statute was
upheld, the possibility existed that other state takeover statutes with similarly broad jurisdictional requirements, but with perhaps incompatible disclosure and registration requirements,
could regulate the same tender offer. See id. at 642.
In the years preceding the CTS decision, the lower courts had been liberally applying the
free market philosophy reflected in the MITE decision. Following the logic of MITE's Commerce Clause analysis and the plurality's preemption opinion, the lower courts placed severe
limitations on state lawmaking powers in the takeover context, striking any legislation which
tended to interfere with the market for corporate control (as violative of the Commerce
Clause), or which tipped the balance in takeover battles in favor of management (as preempted by the Williams Act). Statutes were not infrequently found to be both preempted and
in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Control share acquisitions were the most vulnerable to constitutional attack. In Terry v.
Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986), a United States district court granted a
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Hawaii control share acquisition statute
on the ground that it violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 165-66, 168. The court also suggested that the Act might be preempted by the Williams Act. Id. at 166-68. In APL Ltd.
Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985), a district court held
an early version of a Minnesota control share acquisition statute unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds. Id. at 1225. A Missouri statute was declared unconstitutional on both
Commerce Clause and preemption grounds in Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1415, 141920 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
The Indiana statute, after being declared unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit, Dy-
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resoundingly reaffirmed the right of states to promulgate corporate

law, and stressed the hesitancy with which the Court, absent a clear
indication from Congress, would interfere with that right. Any ex-

tensive federal intervention into the takeover arena, it would seem,
was now to be legislative rather than judicial.
The Indiana Act upheld in CTS is a typical control share acquisition statute."' The Act provides that an acquiror who passes certain levels of share ownership in a subject corporation"' will receive
voting rights in its shares only "to the extent granted by resolution
approved by the shareholders."" The acquiror may insist that management call a shareholder meeting for the purpose of voting within
fifty days of filing an "acquiring person statement,"11 4 and will be
granted voting rights only if a majority of "disinterested" shareholders (all shares except those owned by the acquiror or by officers or
inside directors)" 5 vote in favor of the grant."'
Dynamics Corporation of America, which was seeking to acquire shares in CTS, an Indiana corporation, challenged this statute
on both preemption and Commerce Clause grounds. For its preemption argument, Dynamics argued, inter alia, that the potential fifty
day delay imposed by the Indiana Act far exceeded the minimum
twenty day tender offer period in the Williams Act, and that the
Indiana Act therefore improperly tipped the balance in takeover batnamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), was, of course, found to
be constitutional by the Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69 (1987). A decision invalidating the Ohio statute, Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman,
796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), was also up on appeal to the Supreme Court at the time the
CTS decision was issued. The Supreme Court remanded the Fleet decision for consideration
by the circuit court in light of the Supreme Court's decision in CTS. Fleet, 481 U.S. 1026
(1987).
For a detailed discussion of these statutes and cases, see Balotti & Pospisil, State AntiTakeover Statutes, in I PRACTISING LAW INST., HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
1987, at 527 (1987); Veasey & Mongan, State Takeover Statutes, in 1 PRACTISING LAW
INST.. HOSTILE BATrLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL THE NEW MARKET ENVIRONMENT 1988,
at 179 (1988).
111. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing control share acquisition
statutes).
112. The Indiana Act only applies to a company which is incorporated in Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN § 23-1-20-5 (West 1989), and has: (1) 100 or more shareholders; (2) its principal
place of business, its principal office, or substantial assets within Indiana; and (3) either (a)
more than 10% of its shareholders resident in Indiana, (b) more than 10% of its shares owned
by Indiana residents, or (c) 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana. Id. § 23-1-42-4(a).
113. Id. § 23-1-42-9(a).
114. Id. § 23-1-42-6.
115. Id. § 23-1-42-3.
116. Id. § 23-1-42-9(b).
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tles in favor of incumbent managers. 117
Though Dynamics' argument would seem to follow naturally

from the Court's plurality reasoning in MITE,"18 the CTS Court
found the fact that the legislation could delay the tender offer pro-

cess not to be decisive."19 Stressing its hesitancy to preempt state
corporate law, the Court remarked, "The longstanding prevalence of
state regulation in this area suggests that, if Congress had intended
to pre-empt all state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control
following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly."' 12
Accepting without critical examination Indiana's contention
that its Act was intended, like most control share acquisition statutes, to protect shareholders from two-tiered offers,' 2 ' the CTS

Court found that the Act furthered, rather than frustrated, the pur22
pose of the Williams Act.
Dynamics' Commerce Clause argument was no more successful

than its preemtion argument. The Court, applying a traditional
Commerce Clause analysis, first found that the Indiana Act was not
per se unconstitutional since it did not discriminate against interstate
117. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 84-85 (1987).
118. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. The CTS Court was not bound by
the broad preemption analysis of the MITE plurality. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 81. Nevertheless,
it applied that reasoning, without expressly adopting or questioning it, since, in the Court's
view, the Indiana statute was lawful even under the broad MITE analysis. Id. at 80-81.
119. CTS, 481 U.S. at 83-86.
120. Id. at 86. The Court also questioned whether the Indiana Act actually caused a
delay in the tender offer process since an offeror, according to the Court, can simply accept
shares on the condition that it receive subsequent shareholder approval for its acquisition. Id.
at 84-85. Dynamics responded to this argument by noting that even if the offeror makes its
offer conditional, management will still be in place for an additional three weeks and would
have "'free rein to take other defensive steps that will diminish the value of the tendered
shares.'" Id. at 85 n.9 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 37, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (No. 86-71)). The Court rejected this contention, apparently on
the premise that such mismanagement was a subject for state regulation and was not regulated
by the Williams Act. See id. Again, however, such a narrow reading of the Williams Act
would seem to be in conflict with the reasoning of the MITE plurality.
121. As the Court explained:
[T]he Act protects [shareholders] from the coercive aspects of some tender offers.
If, for example, shareholders believe that a successful tender offer will be followed
by a purchase of nontendering shares at a depressed price, individual shareholders
may tender their shares-even if they doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's
best interest-to protect themselves from being forced to sell their shares at a depressed price .... In such a situation under the Indiana Act, the shareholders as a
group, acting in the corporation's best interest, could reject the offer, although individual shareholders might be inclined to accept it.
Id. at 83.
122. Id.
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commerce. 123 Specifically, the Court noted that the Act treated Indi1 24
ana and non-Indiana acquirors alike.
The Court then appears to have applied a balancing test similar
to that employed in MITE.1 25 In striking contrast to MITE, however, the CTS Court resoundingly rejected the argument that state
legislation may not interfere with an open market for corporate control. 2 6 Instead, the Court found that, in light of the fact that the
entities being traded in the market for corporate control-corporations-are themselves nothing more than creations of
state law,' 27 states were free to interfere with the market as much as
they desired, as long as the state legislation was nondiscrim1 28
inatory.
II.

Lesson #1:

STATE INCOMPETENCE TO REGULATE CORPORATE

TAKEOVERS: PROTECTIONIST TAKEOVER LEGISLATION

CTS breathed new life into state takeover regulation. In the aftermath of the decision, numerous states enacted second generation
takeover statutes in quick succession. 2 9 Most significantly, Dela123. Id. at 87-88.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 88-89.
126. Id. at 89-90.
127. In reversing the lower court, which had found the Indiana Act to be violative of the
Commerce Clause, the Court remarked that "the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the
significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state
law." Id. at 89. Indeed, the majority stressed: "It . . . is an accepted part of the business
landscape in this country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to
define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares." Id. at 91.
128. In the Court's words:
The very commodity that is traded in the securities market is one whose characteristics are defined by state law. Similarly, the very commodity that is traded in the
"market for corporate control"-the corporation-is one that owes its existence and
attributes to state law. Indiana need not define these commodities as other States
do; it need only provide that residents and nonresidents have equal access to them.
This Indiana has done. Accordingly, even if the Act should decrease the number of
successful tender offers for Indiana corporations, this would not offend the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
129. See Idaho Governor Signs Anti-Takeover Law Modeled After Indiana, New York,
20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 501 (Apr. 1, 1988); Wisconsin Governor Signs Two Antitakeover Measures, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1463 (Sept. 25, 1988); Bill Modeled on Indiana Law Signed into Law by Missouri Governor, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1269 (Aug.
14, 1987) (revision of an earlier law); Arizona Antitakeover Bill Signed During Special Session, 19 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1138 (July 31, 1987); Massachussets Adopts Broad
Anti-Takeover Law, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1099 (July 24, 1987); Legislative Briefs,
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 871 (June 12, 1987); North CarolinaLegislature Responds to
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ware, the leading corporate law state, 130 adopted a second generation
statute.131 While remnants of the checks placed on state lawmaking
by MITE remain, and may still be used to invalidate certain takeover statutes, 3 2 the larger question of whether state takeover regulation should be permitted has for the most part been shifted by CTS
from the courts to Congress.
This Part of the Article and the next consider what, if anything,
the federal response to state takeover legislation should be. Starting
from the premise that the federal government should defer as much
as possible to state regulation, these sections set out to determine
how the state system has functioned. Only when it is concluded that
the state system is performing inadequately does the Article suggest
that some form of federal limitation on state takeover regulation
might be appropriate.
As will be seen, a close examination of the phenomenon of state
takeover regulation suggests two different ways in which the system
of state corporate lawmaking has malfunctioned. This Part explores
the first of the problems-the problem of protectionist takeover legislation. Part III considers the problem of a management bias in
takeover legislation.
A. Protectionist Motivated Takeover Legislation
On the surface, state takeover legislation seems both well-intentioned and relatively innocuous. In most instances, states appear to
be providing protection for shareholders through increased disclosures or protection from coercive offers.' In addition, in a few instances, states seem to be providing some limited relief from the dislocative effects of takeovers to nonshareholder corporate
Attempted Takeover of Burlington, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 829 (June 5, 1987).
130. Delaware is the state of incorporation for over half of the Fortune 500 companies.

See Letter from SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest to the Council of the Corporation
Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association 2 (Dec. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Grundfest Letter], reprintedin C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, GUIDE TO THE TAKEOVER LAW OF DELAWARE app.
E at 161, 162 (1988).
131. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988). See generally Delaware Governor
Signs Law Restricting Hostile Takeovers, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 188 (Feb. 5, 1988)
(discussing Delaware's antitakeover statute and its operation). For a detailed discussion of the
Delaware statute, see infra notes 231-93 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988) (enjoining
enforcement of a Massachusetts takeover statute).

133. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text (discussing fair price, control share
cash-out, control share acquisition and modified disclosure statutes which purport to protect
shareholders).
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constituencies.134 None of this legislation would seem to give cause
for federal intervention.
Nevertheless, it is the thesis of this Section that often these arguably legitimate goals of state takeover regulation are in fact simply a facade, and that, in truth, underneath this facade the true motivation for the legislation is protectionism-specifically, to stop
takeovers that threaten large local employers. If this thesis is correct,
then some form of federal intervention to curb protectionist takeover
legislation is appropriate. Indeed, protectionist legislation has long
been shunned in our federal system. 13 5 Before discussing what the
federal response to protectionist takeover legislation should be, however, it is first necessary to consider the evidence that such a protectionist motivation exists.
1. Evidence of a Protectionist Motivation.- Though not all
scholars would acknowledge that states have enacted takeover legislation for the purpose of trying to thwart takeovers of large local
employers, 136 the evidence appears to be overwhelming.
134. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (discussing business combination
statutes and modified fiduciary duty).
135. See Regan, supra note 17, at 1094-95. Commercial protectionism between the
states under the Articles of Confederation appears to have been the primary impetus for the
adoption of the Commerce Clause at the Constitutional Convention. See Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 430, 435 (1982); Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1206-08 (1986).
136. Professor Roberta Romano, for example, has expressed doubt as to whether protectionism is actually the moving force behind state takeover legislation. Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. I11 (1987). Based on a study of the politics
underlying a Connecticut takeover statute, she concluded that state takeover regulation was
better explained by a "putting out fires" analysis--"that legislators are reacting to the immediate pressure of a firm in a situation in which support for the bill entails no discernible political cost." Id. at 188. Her conclusion was based on the fact that the Connecticut statute, which
sailed through the State Legislature, was not actively supported by a broad based coalition of
labor and community groups, and rather received active support only from the management of
one large local firm, the Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Company, which also enlisted the
help of Conneticut's most important business association, the Connecticut Business and Industry Association. Id. at 122-23.
Professor Romano is undoubtedly correct in suggesting that state legislators are more
likely to pass bills when they are "presented with an immediate constituent demand, and there
[is] no opposition .
I..."
Id. at 136. This is most likely going to be the case with state takeover
legislation since the group that is arguably most adversely affected by the legislation, shareholders, is in most cases too dispersed and disorganized to marshall any kind of active opposition to the legislation.
However, Professor Romano is probably assuming too much, to the extent that she suggests that this theory alone explains the proliferation of state takeover regulation. To begin
with, there are many recent examples of takeover legislation which do appear to have been
motivated, at least in part, by a desire on the part of legislators to protect a large local employer. See infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text. Second, the absence of lobbying by
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To begin with, there is the timing of the legislation. Over and
over again, statutes have been enacted during frenzied legislative
sessions occurring in the midst of battles for control of large local
employers.13 7 Such circumstances usually leave little doubt that the
purpose of the legislation is to protect the employers.138 Indeed, it is
labor or community groups for any given bill does not necessarily imply that legislators are
not, nevertheless, considering the interests of these groups in passing the legislation. Indeed,
one might question whether the Connecticut legislature would have been so solicitous of
Aetna's concerns if Aetna was not a significant local employer and income producer in the
state. Moreover, considering the speed with which these bills often race through legislatures,
groups with large or dispersed memberships like unions or community organizations might not
even have time to organize a lobbying effort. Senior managers of a large local employer obviously need almost no time to organize. In addition, lobbying by labor or community groups
often may be unnecessary since, as Professor Romano's theory suggests, the bills are likely to
pass given the absence of any active opposition. Romano, supra, at 188.
In a similar vein, it is illuminating to note that in perhaps the most important instance in
which there was active opposition to the passage of a takeover bill, i.e., the recent enactment of
the Delaware second generation statute, labor groups did actively lobby in favor of the legislation. See Joint Hearingsof the House and Senate JudiciaryComms. on House Substitute No.
I to House Bill 396 (Jan. 20-21, 1988) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (on file at Hofstra Law
Review) (statement of Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local #8-898 President Arthur R.
Wilson); id. (statement of Independent Federation of Flight Attendants President Victoria
Frankovich); id. (statement of Delaware State UAW/CAP Council President Ronald E.
Queen); id. (statement of ConAgra, Inc. Processing Plant Manager Jerry Davis).
Professor Coffee has expressed disagreement with Professor Romano's conclusions. See
Coffee, The Future of Corporate Federalism:State Competition and the New Trend Toward
De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 759, 761 (1987). In contrast to
Professor Romano, for example, Coffee argues that:
[s]tates within the Rust Belt have been the most aggressive in passing the new second generation of antitakeover laws to respond to powerful internal coalitions of
local firms, unions, and their satellite constituencies (including local law firms) that
fear management ouster, plant closings, and the firm's physical departure from the
state.
Id. at 770.
Many other scholars have expressed the view that takeover legislation might be motivated
by protectionist concerns. See, e.g., Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulationof Tender
Offers, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 768-69 (1971); Langevoort, supra note 12; Langevoort, supra
note 43; Moylan, supra note 46; Sargent, supra note 44; accord Richter, States Act to Stem
Tide of Takeovers, L.A. Times, Sept. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (stating that "[a]nti-takeover
measures have swept through state after state in recent months, propelled by the influence of
local companies and the appeal such bills hold for legislators eager to vote for local jobs and
businesses.").
137. See Romano, supra note 136, at 137; Labaton, States Protect Merger Targets,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1987, at D2, col. 1;Miller, How IndianaShielded a Firm and Changed
the Takeover Business, Wall St. J., July 1, 1987 at 1, col. 6.
138. See Letter from SEC Commissioner Charles C. Cox to the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association 1-2 (Dec. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Cox Letter], reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. D at 157-58 (commenting
that "at least half of the states" that adopted Indiana-type statutes after the CTS decision
"did so with a clearly protectionist purpose with overnight specials designed to preclude a
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even typically obvious exactly which local employer the legislation is
intended to protect. 139 The examples are numerous: Washington
passed a statute to protect Boeing;14 0 Minnesota passed a statute to
protect Dayton-Hudson; 14 ' Massachusetts passed a statute to protect

Gillette;1 42 Missouri passed a statute to protect TWA; 4 3 Arizona

passed a statute to protect Greyhound;14 4 North Carolina passed a

statute to protect Burlington Industries; 145 Wisconsin passed a statute to protect G. Heilmann;146 Florida passed a statute to protect
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich;

CBS.

48

47

New York passed a statute to protect

This same phenomenon appears to have been true for the

earlier first generation statutes as well. 4 9
hostile takeover of a 'hometown' company.").
139. See Hersch, State Takeover Laws: The Third Generation, in PRACTISING LAW
INST., EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 107, 108 (1987) [hereinafter EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION]; Kjellenberg, The Model
Control Share Act is the Best State Takeover Law Alternative, 8 N. ILL U.L. REV. 329, 331
n.10 (1988) (listing states which have enacted statutes in response to threatened takeovers of
local companies). See generally Butler, supra note 12 (discussing takeover legislation enacted
to protect specific local companies).
140. New Washington Takeover Law Aimed at Protecting Boeing from Pickens Raid,
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1266 (Aug. 14, 1987).
141. Minnesota Adopts Anti-Takeover Law After Special Legislative Session, 19 See.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 987 (July 3, 1987); Kilman & Schwadel, Minnesota Passes AntiTakeover Bill Sought to Thwart Dayton Hudson Suitor, Wall St. J, June 26, 1987, at 6, col.
1.
142. Massachussets Adopts Broad Anti-Takeover Law, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1099 (July 24, 1987); Miller, supra note 137, at 1, col. 6.
143. See Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1405-06 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (describing legislative activities preceeding amendments to the Missouri statute so that it would apply to
TWA); Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 59, at 333.
144. Arizona Antitakeover Bill Signed DuringSpecial Session, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1138 (July 31, 1987).
145. North Carolina Legislature Responds to Attempted Takeover of Burlington, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 829 (June 5, 1987); Miller, supra note 137, at 1, col. 6.
146. Wisconsin Governor Signs Two Antitakeover Measures, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1463 (Sept. 25, 1987).
147. Labaton, States Protect Merger Targets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1987, at D2, col. 1.
148. Block, Barton & Roth, supra note 59, at 333.
149. See, e.g., Moylan, supra note 46, at 690-91 (stating that "[t]he Ohio Takeover Act
is one of the most glaring examples of special interest legislation .... enacted in response to
the bid by Northwest Industries, Inc. for B.F. Goodrich & Co., an Ohio based company.").
Aranow & Einhorn similarly assert that the first generation statutes "were not academic exercises in the legislative process. In Ohio, Northwest Industries, Inc. had begun what turned into
a hotly contested battle for Ohio-based B.F. Goodrich & Co.... In Pennsylvania, attempted
takeovers of Sharon Steel Corp., Piper Aircraft Corp. and Westinghouse Air Brake Co. may
have influenced the legislature to consider a bill ...." Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 136, at
768-69 n.10.
One commentator explained:
Feeling the federal government insufficiently reponsive to their interests, companies
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In addition, legislators also frequently admit that they are trying to stop takeovers of local employers, even when the legislation

they are enacting purports to protect shareholders. A Pennsylvania
state senator, for instance, during a legislative session for what was
called the Pennsylvania "Shareholder" Protection Act, remarked
that "[t]his bill would basically protect the corporations that are in
Pennsylvania."' 50 Similarly, Governor Celeste of Ohio, while signing
into law new takeover legislation, lamented how hostile takeovers
have cost Ohio millions of dollars and hundreds of jobs. 5 '
On occasion, even the legislation itself suggests a protectionist
purpose. The preamble to a Utah takeover statute, for example, de-

scribes the legislators' concern that takeovers "in many instances
threaten jobs and careers of Utah citizens."' 52
Perhaps the best clue of a protectionist purpose, however, comes
from the jurisdictional reach of many takeover statutes. Though
turned to the states for protection. Corporations provide states with jobs for their
citizens, tax revenues for their budgets and prestige for their public images. In return, many states have been willing to provide corporations with legal and regulatory environments conducive to conducting their businesses. By 1982, 37 states had
heeded the corporate cry for protection and had enacted laws that required greater
disclosure than the Williams Act did.
S. PAMEPINTO, supra note 46, at 3. Another commentator similarly noted:
Potential targets seeking further protection began to turn to the states. They pointed
out the potential deleterious effects that a change to out-of-state ownership or control could have on state economies. States feared that a change in control could
result in less attention to local concerns and needs, or possibly the removal of investment and jobs. Some corporations hinted that they might consider relocation or
reincorporation in a state more solicitous of their needs. By the mid-1970s many of
the states had responded by enacting takeover statutes.
C. NICHOLAS, FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS INVOLVING TENDER OFFER REGULATION 4 (1985).
150. Steinberg, The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 184,
185 (1984) (quoting a statement by Sen. Fumo during the Pennsylvania State Senate's consideration of S. 1144 on Dec. 6, 1983); see also Pennyslvania Enacts Law Against Hostile Takeovers, 20 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 502 (Apr. 1, 1988) (quoting Pennsylvania Governor
Robert P. Casey, in signing a new law which authorized the use of poison pills and other
defensive measures, as stating, "The legislation will provide much needed new protections
against hostile takeovers that weaken Pennsylvania business, eliminate jobs and threaten the
communities built on the strength of our industrial base .... " (citation omitted)); Newlin &
Gilmer, supra note 93, at 112 (discussing motivation for Pennsylvania's takeover legislation).
151. New Ohio Law to Assist Firms in Rejecting Hostile Takeover Attempts, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 345 (Mar. 6, 1987); see also Greenhouse, Ohio's Tough Takeover
Curb, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1986, at D2, col. 1.
152. UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-5-1(I)(c) (Supp. 1988) (repealed 1987). The statutory codification of the legislative intent also reflects the legislature's recognition that takeovers "can
result in plant closings or consolidations that damage communities dependent on the jobs and
taxes provided by these plants." Id. § 61-5-1(1)(d); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01
(West 1986 & Supp. 1989) (providing a similar description of legislative intent).
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most statutes purport to protect shareholders, many of these same
statutes nevertheless are drafted so as to apply to acquisitions of target companies that are neither incorporated in the legislating state
nor have a large percentage of local shareholders.153
Such broad jurisdictional reach seems puzzling: Why would
states want to protect the shareholders of these target companies?
The only credible explanation, it is suggested, is that they do not.
Rather, the statutes contain these broad jurisdictional limits because
they were actually enacted for the purpose of protecting large local
employers."" Thus, in those cases where a large employer was not
incorporated in the state, the legislators simply stretched the jurisdictional boundaries of their "shareholder" legislation to make sure
that the company was covered.
The Illinois statute at issue in MITE exemplifies this situation.155 The statute was a disclosure provision, presumably intended
to benefit shareholders. 15 6 Nevertheless, the statute potentially applied to target companies whose only contact with the state was that
they had their principal place of business and substantial assets in
57
the state.'
This same phenomenon is true for some second generation statutes. When Carl Icahn made overtures for TWA, a Delaware corporation but a significant Missouri employer, Missouri amended its
control share acquisition statute so as to apply to foreign common
carriers financed by Missouri subdivisions that have over 7,500 employees in Missouri. 5 "
Of course, it is not suprising that protectionism underlies many
state takeover statutes. From the perspective of state legislators, anyone threatening to disrupt the business of a large local employer
would naturally be considered a threat, and any legislation that
153. See supra notes 54, 107 and accompanying text.
154. See Boehm, supra note 43, at 746; Langevoort, supra note 43, at 219-26.
155. Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL REV. STAT. Ch. 121 2 paras. 137.51-137.70
(1979) (repealed 1983).
156. See supra notes 62, 77 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
158. See Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (indicating that
counsel for the defendant conceded that TWA was the only known company to meet the statute's new jurisdictional requirement); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting
that Missouri's statute was apparently enacted primarily to protect TWA). Similarly, when
Revlon approached Gillette, a large Massachusetts employer but a Delaware corporation,
Massachusetts enacted a control share acquisition statute that applied to targets having a substantial presence in the state, including a large number of employees. See supra note 142 and
accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:535

would repel such an acquiror would undoubtedly be welcome. This is
all the more true in the takeover context, where the cost of the legislation can be spread outside the state to the typically nationwide
group of shareholders who are denied the opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium, and to the group of out-of-state employees that
may have stood to benefit from a change in corporate policy.15
Protectionism, in fact, can help explain some of the oddities
about takeover legislation which distinguish it from other forms of
corporate law. First, as already discussed, it can explain why states
sometimes try to stretch their corporate lawmaking powers to cover
corporations that are not incorporated in their state-the states
might simply be trying to use their corporate laws for the purpose
of
16 0
employer.
incorporated)
foreign
(but
local
protecting a large
Second, a protectionist purpose helps explain why many states,
which have not otherwise been on the cutting edge of corporate law,
have been so quick to enact takeover legislation.' 6 ' Quite simply, the
legislators may have been 62
pushed into action by the threatened takeover of a local employer.1
Conversely, protectionism can help explain why Delaware, traditionally the leading corporate law state, was slow to pass a second
generation statute. Tiny Delaware, which has few large local employers, might simply not have had a crisis situation arise in which
its legislature would have felt compelled to help protect a large local
employer. 6 a Moreover, it might have felt less pressure to enact such
legislation to protect its chartering business because many states
were willing to pass statutes to protect corporations even if they were
not the state of incorporation. 6
Lastly, a protectionist purpose helps explain the odd medley of
state takeover legislation which has developed-some of which purports to protect shareholders while some openly admits to protecting
159.

R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1059-60 (1986);

see also Langevoort, supra note 12, at 96. It is precisely because protectionist legislation attempts to benefit a state's local constituents at the expense of out-of-state parties, who have no
recourse to the state's legislature, that federal intervention to invalidate protectionist legislation has been thought necessary. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
163. See Comment, Third-GenerationAnti-Takeover Statutes in Oregon and Indiana
After Dynamics: Target Corporations Control the Ship and Raiders are Foiled, 24 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 73, 98 (1988) (authored by Russel D. Garrett).
164. See supra notes 54, 107 and accompanying text.
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employees and communities.16 5 It can also explain why legislatures
are frequently able to consider these seemingly quite different statutes in unison, and even in the alternative, since ultimately all of the
legislation has the same goal in mind-to impede takeovers. 166
2. How Takeover Legislation Can Effectuate A Protectionist
Purpose.- Looming behind this entire discussion are two pestering
questions: why do states try to disguise their protectionist motivated
legislation in the form of shareholder protection legislation and how
could such shareholder-oriented legislation effectuate a protectionist
purpose?
The answers are clear. As to the first question, it need only be
recognized that an openly protectionist statute, such as a statute forbidding outright the acquisition of a local company, would invite federal intervention-specifically through judicial application of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 6 By contrast, if a state can
disguise its protectionist legislation in the form of shareholder protection legislation, then the legislation becomes eminently more
palatable.' 68 Indeed, by casting their protectionist legislation as corporate law, states can lend to this otherwise unlawful legislation the
air of legitimacy which attaches to this traditional realm of state
lawmaking.
The facts in CTS 69 may very well provide a good example. In
that case, the dissent forcefully argued that Indiana admitted in its
brief that "at least one of the [Act's] goals is to protect Indiana
corporations,' 70 and that such legislation was "the archetype of the
165. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
166. Pennsylvania takeover legislation, for instance, included both a control share cashout statute and a modified fiduciary duty provision. See Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 93, at
113-16.
167. See Regan, supra note 17, at 1092 (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be concerned almost exclusively with "preventing states from engaging in
purposeful economic protectionism.").
168. See Eule, supra note 135, at 460. In discussing the difficulty in ascertaining an
unlawful discriminatory or protectionist intent in state legislation, Professor Eule remarks that
"[flew statutes are so inartfully drafted that they boldly reveal an intent to discriminate
against non-citizens. The fact that the discrimination has non-residents, rather than a racial or
religious minority, as its target may make it more socially acceptable, but legislatures are
seldom less secretive in their efforts to carry it out." Id.; cf Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (involving a state statute regulating grading on
apples which was purportedly intended to protect consumers but which may have served an
ulterior purpose of protecting local apple growers from competition by out-of-state growers).
169. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
170. Id. at 100 (White, J., dissenting).
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kind of state law that the Commerce Clause forbids.' 7 1 The majority, however, without inquiring into the factual history of the legislation, uncritically accepted the argument that the Act, like most conwas intended to protect shareholders
trol share acquisition statutes,
72
offers.1
two-tiered
from
As to the second question-whether shareholder-oriented legislation could effectuate a protectionist purpose-the answer is again
clear. Quite simply, to the extent that these "shareholder" statutes
can make takeovers more costly or difficult, or even simply delay
takeovers so that managers can implement defensive tactics, they
can help accomplish the protectionist7 goal of discouraging unwanted
takeovers of large local employers.' 1
First generation statutes, for instance, through their provisions
for pre-registration of offers and lengthy public hearings, could
greatly delay the offering process.' 74 Moreover, and much less subtly, the statutes provided a powerful weapon for stopping unwanted

takeovers by granting state officials broad discretion to enjoin nationthe offers were found to be "unfair" or the
wide tender offers when
175
disclosure inadequate.
Similarly, second generation statutes also make takeovers more
difficult. Fair price, control share acquisition, and control share cashout statutes, for instance, make acquisitions more expensive by eliminating the ability of offerors to use two-tiered offers.' 7 6 In addition,
control share cash-out and control share acquisition models threaten
171. Id. at 101.
172. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
173. Of course, some takeover legislation might be more effective than others in effectuating a protectionist purpose and some, regardless of the legislative intent, may even backfire
by making takeovers easier. Some scholars have contended, for example, that control share
acquisition provisions actually make takeovers easier because shareholders tend to vote in favor
of the acquisitions. See R. GILSON, supra note 159, at 308-12 (Supp. 1988) (arguing that
control share acquisition statutes "actually may work in favor of the acquirer."); C. SMITH &
C. FURLOW, supra note 130, at 8 (describing the concern of the Council of the Corporation
Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association that a statute modeled after the Indiana
statute in CTS would "turn every offer into a plebiscite that by its nature would favor the
bidder, and could actually promote takeovers."). Nevertheless, many states have enacted such
statutes for apparently protectionist reasons. See Cox Letter, supra note 138, at 2, reprinted in
C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. D at 158 n.2 (suggesting that North Carolina,
Washington, Minnesota, Massachusetts and Florida all adopted Indiana-style control share
acquisition statutes after the CTS decision in efforts to protect large local employers).
174. See Boehm, supra note 43, at 735; Langevoort, supra note 43, at 226-28; Wilner &
Landy, supra note 46, at 9-15; supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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acquirors with the ominous possiblity of either having to accomplish
a second-step transaction against their will, or more ominously, of
acquiring a control interest in a company without the accompanying
177
voting rights.
Likewise, freeze-out statutes will discourage any hostile acquiror that wants to, or needs to, engage in a business combination
with the target corporation any time soon after acquiring control. 178
The statutes will discourage leveraged acquisitions in particular because acquirors in such instances frequently need to sell off target
assets soon after the acquisition in order to satisfy their debt
obligations. 79
Finally, modified fiduciary statutes simply give corporate managers additional discretion to be used in a takeover fight. 8 0
B.

Federal Limitations on Corporate Law: Responding to
Protectionist Takeover Legislation

If states are enacting takeover legislation for a protectionist purpose, what, if anything, should be the federal response? Protectionist
legislation, after all, has long been considered unlawful in our federal system. 8" That it would take the form of corporate law should
not seem to matter.
Indeed, protectionist takeover legislation would seem to have all
the hallmarks of traditional protectionist legislation. It is inefficient' 8 2-the legislating state is trying to keep a business' operations
177. See generally Sargent, supra note 44, at 27 (analyzing the burden on interstate
commerce created by second generation statutes); Note, Antitakeover Legislation:Not Necessary, Not Wise, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303, 332 (1987) (authored by Jeffrey A. Johnson)
(arguing that a requirement of shareholder approval would reduce the possibility of takeovers);
see also Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on
the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 801 (1982) (discussing the effectiveness of similar charter amendments).
178. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing business combination
statutes).
179. See R. GILSON, supra note 159, at 321 (Supp. 1988); Grundfest Letter, supra note
130, at 12, reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. E at 172.
180. Steinberg, supra note 150, at 186 (commenting that "[b]y expressly authorizing
officers and directors to consider noninvestor interests, the [Pennsylvania modified fiduciary
duty statute], in practical effect, may expand the presumption of the business judgment rule,
thereby rendering it nearly impossible for a complainant to overcome."); see also infra note
280.
181. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
182. The point is not that states may not pass any law which interferes with the movement of productive resources from higher to lower cost producers, but that states may not do
so when the primary purpose is to protect local producers from interstate competition. See
Regan, supra note 17, at 1115-25. See generally Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judi-
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within the state even when those operations might be performed

more efficiently elsewhere.18 3 It raises political process
problems 184-specifically, those adversely impacted by the legislation
(the nationwide group of shareholders who are deprived of a pre-

mium for their shares and out-of-state employees who might benefit
from takeovers) are outside the legislating state and thus lack political recourse to the state's legislators. 5 Finally, it is hostile to the
concept of "unionism" which binds our country together' 6-the

leg-

islation is .deliberately aimed at benefitting one state's economy even
when that benefit might come at the expense of the other states.

If protectionist takeover legislation is thought harmful, the
question turns from whether the federal government should intervene

to the manner by which it should intervene.
1. Fashioning a Response: Using the Commerce Clause to
Strike Takeover Legislation.- Historically, the federal response to
protectionist state legislation has not been to invalidate entire areas
of state law, but rather to strike, through judicial interpretation of
cial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563 (1983). Protectionist legislation, as Justice Cardozo once
observed, attempts to "neutralize the economic consequences of free trade among the states."
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 526 (1935). States may seek to accomplish this
either by keeping out interstate competition through vehicles such as tariffs or embargoes, or
by forcing an industry to remain in the state, such as requiring production to occur within the
state. See Regan, supra note 17, at 1112.
183. Such legislation has traditionally been unfavorably received by the Courts. The
Supreme Court "has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere."
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
184. See L. TRIBE, supra note 68, § 6-5, at 408-13; Eule, supra note 135, at 438-39. As
Justice Stone observed in South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177 (1938):
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain
for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden
those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within, have
been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though Congress
has not acted. ...
Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial
opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to
those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects
adversely some interests within the state.
Id. at 184 n.2 (citations omitted).
185. R. GILSON, supra note 159, at 1059-60; Langevoort, supra note 12, at 96.
186. See Regan, supra note 17, at 1114 (arguing that protectionist legislation "generate[s] a cycle of escalating animosity and isolation" among the states, imperilling the union).
As Justice Cardozo observed: "[The Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division." Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
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the Commerce Clause, that legislation which has been enacted for
an unlawful protectionist purpose. The Commerce Clause grants to
Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several
States . . .,. Nevertheless, it has long been established that the

Clause also implicitly prohibits the states from taking certain actions
which interfere with interstate commerce.' 88 Of those actions, none
has been considered to be more hostile to the values embodied in the
Commerce Clause than economic protectionism. 8 9
The primary advantage of using a Commerce Clause approach
to strike improperly motivated takeover legislation is that such approach would not preclude legitimate state regulation of takeovers.
This surgical approach seems appropriate since protectionist legislation says little about whether the market for corporate charters, in
the absence of distorting protectionist motivations, will cause states
to properly regulate the takeover phenomenon.
Protectionist takeover legislation is not a product of the market
for corporate charters, but rather, like all protectionist state law, occurs because state legislators feel pressured to protect their local
constituents from the forces of interstate competition. 90 Such protectionist corporate law is no more likely to occur than protectionist
state regulation of milk prices.' 9 ' In both cases, the legislation is
simply symptomatic of the tension and natural structural bias inherent in local lawmaking within a federal system. 92 As Professor Tribe
observed, "the proper structural role of state lawmakers is to protect
and promote the interests of their own constituents," and "[tihat
role is one that they will inevitably try to fulfill even at the expense
of citizens of other states.' 93
Since protectionist takeover legislation is not a product of the
state competition for charters, the appropriate federal response to
such corporate legislation should not be to invalidate all state corporate lawmaking in the takeover context, but only that which has
187. US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
188. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
189. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Regan, supra note 17, at 1092 (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be concerned almost exclusively with
"preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism.").
190. See L. TRIBE, supra note 68, § 6-5, at 409.
191. Cf. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (striking down New York
legislation seeking to protect local dairy farmers from out-of-state competition).
192. L. TRIBE, supra note 68, § 6-5, at 409.

193.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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been tainted by a protectionist motivation. Unfortunately, however,

the Supreme Court in both MITE and CTS failed to adequately address the issue of protectionism. To the contrary, the only Justices to
directly discuss the issue were the dissenters in CTS, who argued
that the Indiana control share acquisition statute had been enacted

for the unlawful purpose of protecting Indiana corporations.' 94
2. Rethinking the MITE and CTS Decisions.- When evaluating state legislation under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis,

courts generally use a two-tiered approach. 195 First, the court examines whether the legislation discriminates against interstate com-

merce.' 96 A law which discriminates for the primary purpose of protecting local residents from out-of-state competition is typically
found to be per se unlawful. 97 Conversely, a law which has a legitimate, i.e., non-protectionist, purpose but a discriminatory impact,
will be upheld if the state can "justify it both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
19....
"8
Legislation which is not discriminatory is then subject to the

second-tier balancing analysis, in which the burden which the legislation imposes on interstate commerce is weighed against any local

benefits furthered by the legislation. 9 The state legislation will be
held invalid if the burden on interstate commerce "is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."200
Protectionist legislation would typically fall under the first tier
194. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 99-101 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986). As the Supreme Court stated in Brown-Forman:
This Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to analyzing state
economic regulation under the Commerce Clause. When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor instate economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down
the statute without further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined
whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.
Id. (citations omitted).
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (stating
that "'where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se
rule of invalidity has been erected.'" (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978))).
198. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
199. See supra note 69 (setting forth the Pike balancing test).
200. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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of this analysis. Indeed, protectionist legislation-which seeks to
benefit in-state economic actors at the expense of the citizens of the
other states-is precisely the kind of discriminatory legislation which
the Commerce Clause is intended to prevent.20 1
In MITE, however, the Court never addressed this discrimination issue. Instead, the Court struck down the Illinois statute under a
balancing analysis because it placed an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 202 Nevertheless, as previously pointed out, the jurisdictional reach of the Illinois Act gave at least some indication that the
legislation might have been enacted for a protectionist purpose.20 3
In CTS, the majority did analyze the Indiana statute under a
discrimination test, but concluded that the statute was lawful because it applied equally to in-state and out-of-state acquirors. 0° Arguably, however, this analysis missed the point. If, as the dissent believed, the legislation was enacted for protectionist reasons, 20 5 the
relevant unlawful discrimination would not have been between instate and out-of-state acquirors, but between those whom the state
legislators assumed would favor the continued in-state operations of
a company (current managers) and those whom the legislators assumed might disrupt or remove such operations (any hostile acquiror). °6 It would be through this latter discrimination that the
state legislators would have tried to shelter their local industry from
interstate competition and thus benefit the local employees, suppliers, and communities at the expense of0 7citizens of other states who
might have benefitted from takeovers.
201. See generally Regan, supra note 17, at 1094-95.; Smith, supra note 135.
202. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text (setting forth the Court's burden
analysis). Justice Powell's concurring opinion in MITE, which provided the necessary fifth vote
to find the Illinois statute an unlawful burden on interstate commerce, curiously seems to
suggest that states might lawfully enact legislation intended to block the movement of corporate assets out of a state. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.8 (1982) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Such reasoning, however, seems to be entirely irreconcilable with traditional
Commerce Clause doctrine. See Cox, supra note 12, at 343.
203. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the Illinois statute).
204. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87-88 (1987).
205. Id. at 99-100 (White, J., dissenting).
206. See Cox, supra note 12, at 340-41.
207. See generally id. at 340-43 (suggesting that takeover legislation enacted to protect
local industry violates the Commerce Clause); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 107; Levmore,
supra note 182, at 623-24; Note, The Tender Offer Regulation Battle Continues: Should
States Regulate Only Local Companies?, 60 IND. L.J. 721, 736 (1985) (authored by Phyllis E.
Grimm).
Perhaps most notably, Professor Regan, whose recent article on Commerce Clause juris-
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How, it might be asked, could the Court in CTS have detected

such an unlawful protectionist motivation? A careful exploration of
the facts might have revealed that the statute was enacted for a pro-

tectionist purpose.

08

The Wall Street Journal, for instance, in an

article subsequent to the CTS decision, suggested that the statute
had been enacted to help protect Arvin Industries, a large local employer in Columbus, Indiana, from a takeover attempt by the
2 9
Belzburgs. 0
prudence, Regan, supra note 17, was cited several times by the CTS Court, also suggested in
an article written after the CTS decision that if the Indiana statute in CTS, as the dissent
argued, was intended to protect corporations from takeovers that threatened to remove corporate assets out of the state, then it would be protectionist. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1871 (1987).
208. In fairness to the Court, the Justices did inquire as to the legislative purpose of the
Indiana Act during oral argument. Almost immediately after questioning began, Justice
O'Connor engaged in the following exchange with James A. Strain, counsel for CTS Corporation, who was seeking to have the statute upheld:
QUESTION: Mr. Strain, may I inquire what you think the purpose of the statute
is?
MR. STRAIN: Of course.
QUESTION: Do you think, at least in part, it is to try to keep jobs and corporate
headquarters and so forth within the State of Indiana.
MR. STRAIN: No, I do not.
QUESTION: It is not a purpose at all?
MR STRAIN: It is my belief that is not the purpose.
QUESTION: We should in making our findings and decision here conclude that
that has no part for consideration in this case, is that right?
MR. STRAIN: Based on the theory that we argue, Justice O'Connor, it makes no
difference.
QUESTION: Well, is it a purpose then to provide protection to stockholders of
public corporations incorporated in Indiana?
MR. STRAIN: Ultimately, that has to be the purpose.
QUESTION: You think that is the purpose?
MR. STRAIN: Yes, ma'am.
Official Transcript Proceedings Before The Supreme Court of the United States at 5-6, CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Nos. 86-71 & 86-97).
Curiously, Mr. Strain had earlier been quoted as giving a strikingly different explanation
for the statute: "We don't like having all our companies taken over by East Coast firms." New
York Takeover Statute's FirstProgeny, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Mar. 1986, at 10. The report
continued: "On further consideration, Strain says Mid-western and West Coast acquirers are
no better." Id.
209. Miller, supra note 137, at 1, col. 6. The article gives the following depiction of
what occurred in Indiana:
One day in December 1985, James K. Baker, the chairman of Arvin Industries,
Inc., summoned his friend Robert Garton to lunch and let him in on a startling
secret. Arvin Industries, an autoparts giant, had received a letter from Canada's
Belzburg family threatening a takeover.
Jim Baker and Bob Garton, the president of the Indiana Senate, went back a
long way together in Columbus ....
Now, Mr. Baker asked his old friend to help
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In addition, the majority could have seized upon, as did the dissent, an admission in Indiana's brief that one of the Act's purposes

was to protect Indiana corporations. 210 As the dissent argued, such a
of the kind of state law
purpose would make the Act "the archetype
211
forbids."
Clause
that the Commerce

And finally, the Indiana Act's jurisdictional reach, like the jurisdictional reach of the statute in MITE, also provided evidence of
the statute's protectionist purpose.2 2 Though the Act requires target
corporations to be incorporated in the state and have a substantial
number of shareholders in the state, both of which could justify the
state's concern in protecting shareholders, the Act also requires that
target corporations have either their principal place of business, principal office, or substantial assets in Indiana."' Why this additional
prerequisite if Indiana is simply trying to protect shareholders? As
one commentator stated, these "preconditions add strength to the ar-

gument that Indiana was seeking to protect 'Indiana management'
and Indiana communities and Indiana residents from foreign competition for target assets." 2 1 '
stop the takeover and save Arvin Industries and Columbus from wrenching change.
Mr. Garton didn't let him down.
Id.
Thomas J. Bamonte, one of the attorneys who represented Dynamics Corporation of
America in CTS, wrote, after the Supreme Court issued its decision, that the Indiana statute
at issue in CTS was "a thinly veiled piece of protectionist legislation designed to shield Indiana
corporations from so-called hostile tender offers." Bamonte, The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A Short Critique of the CTS Decision, 8 N. ILL U.L. REV. 259, 259 (1988).
210. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 100 (White, J., dissenting); see also Cox, supra note 12, at
343.
211. CTS, 481 U.S. at 101 (White, J., dissenting).
212. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing how the jurisdictional
reach of the Illinois statute in MITE indicated a protectionist purpose).
213. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (West 1989).
214. Cox, supra note 12, at 341; see also Langevoort, supra note 12, at 106-07.
It should be noted, however, that even if the Court could not find a protectionist motive
for the legislation, it could still have invalidated the legislation if it concluded the legislation
had a discriminatory impact on interstate commerce and the legislators had not employed the
least restrictive alternative for accomplishing their desired purpose of protecting shareholders
from two-tiered offers. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (holding that a state may not discriminate against interstate commerce "if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available."). Professor
Langevoort, for example, has suggested that whenever a corporate law relates directly to a
shift in corporate control and the law is potentially motivated by a protectionist purpose, the
law must be the least restrictive means of implementing the legitimate legislative goal.
Langevoort, supra note 12, at 108. Here, of course, there was a less restrictive alternative. The
state, rather than imposing the legislation on shareholders, could have passed an enabling statute that would have allowed shareholders to protect themselves by adopting anti-takeover provisions as part of their charter. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
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Two final points of clarification are in order. First, it should be
noted that while neither MITE nor CTS adequately addressed the
issue of protectionism, neither decision would seem to preclude the

lower courts from invalidating other takeover legislation (even control share acquisition statutes modeled after the Indiana Act) if the
courts were presented with strong evidence of a protectionist
motivation.
Lastly, the above discussion is not intended to suggest that
states may not do anything to protect their local employees and communities from takeover-related dislocation. To the contrary, Commerce Clause jurisprudence would seem to suggest that states may

interfere with interstate commerce, for the purpose of furthering a
legitimate state end, as long as the legislation is not purposefully
discriminatory and does not overly burden interstate commerce.15
State severance pay laws or plant closing laws, for instance, might
pass Commerce Clause muster.2 16 Protectionist takeover regulation,
however, does not try to indirectly regulate takeovers to ease their

dislocative effect-it tries to stop takeovers. 17 Such legislation,

Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 101-103 (1986); Note, supra note 12, at 220-23.
215. See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618,
517 P.2d 691 (1973) (upholding an Oregon statute which forbade the use of nonreturnable,
nonrefundable beverage containers for the legitimate purpose of protecting the Oregon enviroment, even though the statute indirectly tended to favor Oregon bottlers over foreign bottlers).
216. See Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1163, 1176
(1984) (suggesting that "[a] workplace protection control generally imposed upon all enterprises in a given state... and operating directly on a managerial, operational decision to close
down a workbench, an assembly line or a plant" would not be per se unconstitutional but
rather would be evaluated under the Pike balancing test). But see Arnold, Existing and Proposed Regulation of Business Dislocations, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 209, 251-53 (1980) (suggesting that a proposed Ohio law which required, inter alia, two years notice of a proposed
shutdown or relocation would not pass constitutional muster); Note, A Legal, Economic, and
Normative Analysis of National Plant Closing Legislation, 11 J. LEGis. 348, 354-55 (1984)
(authored by James M. Cline) (arguing that state plant closing legislation would constitute
unlawful protectionism).
Severance pay or plant closing legislation, however, might run into preemption problems
with the National Labor Relations Act or Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See
generally Note, NLRA Preemption of State and Local Plant Relocation Laws, 86 CoL. L
REV. 407 (1986) (authored by Kyle B. Hettinger). However, the Supreme Court recently upheld a Maine severance pay law against a preemption attack. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
217. Probably the best indication that takeover legislation is aimed at stopping takeovers
and not just regulating for dislocation is that the statutes are all one-sided; that is, they only
try to regulate against dislocation when it occurs at the hands of an acquiror. They do nothing
to prevent current managers from engaging in the very same activity, which is not at all
uncommon.
States are undoubtedly wary of passing across-the-board legislation (such as plant closing
laws or severance pay laws) that would help ease corporate dislocation, whether by an acquiror
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which attempts to stop dislocation by stopping interstate competition, is simply intolerable in our federal system. 18
3. Corporate Law as Immune from Commerce Clause Scrutiny:
Private Action versus State Action.- The one argument against using a Commerce Clause analysis to strike protectionist takeover legislation would be that the legislation is viewed as private action and
not state action, thus immunizing it from constitutional attack. 1 9
or by current managers, because such legislation would be poorly received by the local business
community and might discourage new business from coming to the state. R. GILSON, supra
note 159, at 1060 n. 122. In contrast, legislation which tries to stop takeovers of local companies can at least stop acquiror-motivated dislocation and will be warmly received, if not heavily
lobbied for, by the current business community.
Business combination statutes are a perfect example of one-sided statutes. While the New
York statute, for instance, purports to be concerned with protecting the long-term employment
interests of New York employees, it serves to protect the employees only by discouraging hostile takeovers. Takeovers approved by current managers are not affected by the statute. Moreover, the statute will not stop current managers from heavily leveraging a company (just as an
acquiror might) and then laying off employees.
Another good example of a one-sided statute is the Hawaii Enviromental Disclosure Law,
HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 343D-I to -11 (1985). The statute, which is a variant of a modified preMITE statute, forbids a 10% shareholder of a Hawaii corporation from purchasing an additional 5% %ithin a 12-month period unless the shareholder first files a statement with the
Hawaiian Office of Environmental Control, disclosing, among other things, whether the acquiror has ever been charged with violations of state or federal environmental laws. Id. §
343D-3. While the statute seems reasonable at first glance, one must still wonder why, if
Hawaii is so concerned with its environment, the state doesn't simply pass tough environmental
laws with stiff penalties rather than regulating who owns shares of Hawaiian corporations.
This indirect regulatory approach seems less a way of dealing with Hawaii's environmental
concerns than a way of stopping takovers of local companies. See generally Goelzer & Cohen,
The Empire Strikes Back-Post-MITE Developments in State Antitakeover Regulation, in
TENDER OFFERS

49, 64-66 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985).

218. The Supreme Court has asserted:
Economic welfare is always related to health, for there can be no health if men are
starving. Let such an exception be admitted, and all that a state will have to do in
times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen
must be protected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor
relief lists or perish altogether. To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a
speedy end of our national solidarity.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); see also Lewis v. BT Investment
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43-44 (1980). In Lewis, the Court made the following
observation:
[iun almost any Commerce Clause case it would be possible for a State to argue that
it has an interest in bolstering local ownership, or wealth, or control of business
enterprise. Yet these arguments are at odds with the general principle that the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State from using its regulatory power to protect its
own citizens from outside competition.
Id., See also Langevoort, supra note 12, at 107 (stating that "Itihe motivation of protecting
local businesses ... flies in the face of a core commerce clause value: avoiding local protectionism with respect to the interstate movement of economic resources.").
219. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (stating
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This argument can be approached from several angles. First, it can

be argued that the choice of corporate law is a private decision since
corporations are generally free to move in and out of corporate regulatory regimes, or, even short of reincorporation, often can opt out
from coverage by a specific piece of legislation.220 Second, it can be
argued that takeover legislation is immune from Commerce Clause
scrutiny because it does not absolutely shelter a state's local industry
from interstate competition. Indeed, protectionist takeover legislation
only attempts to stop potential acquirors who legislators fear will
move corporate assets or jobs out of a state.22' It does not in any way
preclude current managers, who are presumably still sensitive to the
forces of interstate competition, from doing the very same thing. 2
Without having to answer this question, it should at least be

recognized that the same way in which corporate law could be considered "private" action, private actions might also be able to correct

for the problem of protectionism. Specifically, if market forces, as
advocates of state corporate lawmaking claim, are successful in eliminating the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership
and control,22a then the state competition for charters would logically
correct for protectionism.
Protectionist legislation is almost certainly hostile to shareholder
that "it has been settled for more than a century that the [Commerce] Clause prohibits States
from taking certain actions respecting interstate commerce even absent congressional action)
(emphasis added); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (1983) (stating that
"Itihe fact that directors of a corporation act pursuant to a state statute provides an insufficient nexus to the State for there to be state action which may violate the Commerce Clause
220. Cox, supra note 12, at 343-45. This theory would fail in those instances when
states enact takeover laws that apply to foreign corporations and do not allow for opting out.
Such legislation, however, is likely to be unconstitutional under the CTS decision. CTS, for all
of its deference to state corporate law, nevertheless strongly suggests that such deference will
only be accorded when states are regulating the internal affairs of their domestic corporations.
See CTS, 481 U.S. at 91 (finding that "[a] State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporationsit charters." (emphasis added)). Thus, takeover legislation that purports to regulate foreign corporations is highly suspect and indeed,
some such legislation has already been invalidated by courts. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989) (invalidating a Tennessee takeover statute to the
extent it applied to foreign corporations); TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp.
1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute to the extent it applied to foreign
corporations).
221. See supra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 85 (quoting Judge Posner in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), that "[t]he Commerce
clause does not allow states to prevent corporations from moving assets and employees to other
states.").
223. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 7; Fischel, supra note 7.
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interests. It prevents the movement of corporate assets to their highest valued use and entrenches managers.22 4 One would expect, there-

fore, in an efficient corporate law regime, that firms would
reincorporate away from states with such statutes.225 Moreover,
states with takeover statutes would eventually feel pressure to elimi-

nate the legislation in order to protect their chartering business.2 6
Such a focus on the effectiveness of the current corporate law
system provides a perfect transition into Part III of this Article,
which focuses directly on this issue. Specifically, Part III examines
the politics of takeover regulation in an effort to determine whether
the market for corporate charters, in the takeover context, is in fact
promoting efficient, shareholder-oriented legislation, 2 7 or is actually

promoting inefficient laws that cater to the concerns of corporate
managers. **s As discussed, such an analysis may help to determine
whether the federal government can rely on the state competition for
charters to correct for the problem of protectionism.
III.

Lesson #2:

STATE INCOMPETENCE TO REGULATE CORPORATE

TAKEOVERS: THE MANAGEMENT BIAS IN THE CHARTERING
MARKET

While protectionism explains much of the phenomenon of state
takeover regulation, it does not explain all. To the contrary, some of
the same takeover statutes which have been enacted in one context
to stop takeovers of local employers, have, in another context, been
just as clearly enacted by states in response to pressures from the
market for corporate charters.2 29
Again, it should be noted that this latter motivation is not protectionism. Though prompted by a desire to protect a local industry
224. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
225. Judge Easterbrook made this argument in a recent decision upholding a Wisconsin
takeover statute. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Food Corp., Slip. op. nos. 89-1581
and 89-1712 (7th Cir. May 24, 1989) at 18-19, quoting Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State
Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause and Insider Trading, 1987
Sup. Cr. REv. 47, 84 (1988); see also Pinto, Takeover Statutes, supra note 12, at 494 (discussing the likely movement of corporations to states without takeover statutes).
226. See sources cited in note 225.
227. But see infra text accompanying note 234.
228. See infra notes 263-77 and accompanying text (analyzing the evidence of management entrenchment motivation in the Delaware Statute).
229. For instance, commentators have suggested that the New York business combination statute was enacted for protectionist reasons, whereas Delaware enacted the same type of
statute in response to pressures from the chartering market, see infra note 233 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 17:535

(a state's chartering business), the legislation seeks to further its

goal not by stopping the flow of commerce out of a state, but by
encouraging commerce to freely flow in. States are simply trying to
maintain the attractiveness of their corporate laws in order to attract

chartering business in the same way that states offer tax incentives
23 °
or run advertising promotions to draw business into their state.
This Part of the Article focuses on the politics of takeover legislation enacted in this new context by focusing primarily on a second
generation statute recently enacted by Delaware.2 3 1 Delaware, of
course, has long been the leading corporate law state,2 32 and the leg-

islative history of its Act makes clear that the primary motivation
for the legislation was to preserve the state's preeminence in the
chartering market.233
The thesis of this Part is that the market for corporate charters,
in choosing to promote takeover legislation, has malfunctioned and
thus justifies some form of federal corrective action. The legislation
being promoted by the market does not further shareholder welfare
as corporate law should. To the contrary, it is management entrench-

ment legislation-legislation which will only serve to decrease manager accountability and exacerbate the agency costs associated with

the separation of ownership and control. In the vernacular of the
230. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining why state actions attempting
to draw business into a state do not constitute protectionism).
231. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8., § 203 (Supp. 1988). Nevada, which has been trying to
compete with Delaware for chartering business, enacted a control share acquisition statute in
1987. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.378-.3793 (Michie Supp. 1987). This statute may also
have been enacted in response to the market for corporate charters rather than for a protectionist purpose.
232. Delaware has every reason to be sensitive to pressures from the chartering market.
Corporate franchise tax and fees currently generate $170 million annually for the tiny state,
which amounts to 17% of the state's total income. Joint Hearings,supra note 136, at 1 (testimony of Delaware Secretary of State Michael E. Harkins), reprinted in C. SMITH & C.
FURLOW, supra note 130, app. Q at 257. These figures do not even include the lucrative legal
practice which has developed in Wilmington to serve the corporate community. Macey &
Miller, supra note 9, at 472.
233. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 136, at 6 (testimony of Delaware Secretary of
State Michael E. Harkins), reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. Q at
259 (stating that "I distributed to each of you the correspondence I have received from over
170 corporations, all of whom have paid a maximum franchise tax of $130,000. Each of them
supports this statute and at least a half a dozen have stated that they would look seriously at
the question of changing their Delaware incorporation."); Montgomery, House Votes 39-0 for
Takeover Bill, Wilmington Morning News, Jan. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 1 - A8, col. I (reporting
that "[tihe Castle administration said that, because 27 other states have passed takeover controls, local efforts to attract new firms could be undermined and an exodus could occur among
Delaware-chartered companies.").
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federalization debate, the market has engaged in a "race to the
bottom."23 4
Such a conclusion is hardly suprising in light of the fact that the
legislation being enacted in response to the chartering market is the
same type of legislation being enacted by other states for protectionist reasons. After all, legislators enacting protectionist corporate laws
certainly do not have shareholder welfare at the forefront of their
agendas.2 35 To the contrary, the legislators' primary goal is to block
the free movement of corporate assets for the purpose of protecting
their state's economy. 36
Conversely, a "management entrenchment" characterization of
takeover legislation enacted in response to the chartering market is
perfectly consistent with the secondary protectionist explanation for
such legislation. In both cases, the primary ulterior goal of the legislation is the same-to keep current management in power. In the
protectionist context, the legislators simply seek this end not so much
for the sake of the managers but out of the hope that by preserving
current managers they will be able to preserve current management
policies, including the current deployment of corporate assets and
2 37
jobs.
If the market for corporate charters is in fact prompting states
to enact management entrenchment legislation, then some form of
federal intervention might be warranted. Such legislation not only
poorly serves the interests of shareholders, it also poorly serves the
interests of the nation at large by removing the incentive which takeovers create for managers to operate their companies efficiently. 3 8
Before addressing what the federal response should be, however,
it is necessary to look at the evidence of the management bias in
takeover legislation. The next section does this by closely examining
the politics underlying the most important statute enacted in response to pressures from the chartering market, the Delaware takeover statute. 39
234. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of the "race to
the bottom").
235. See Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 136, at 768 (observing that state tender offer
legislation "is unique in that it was apparently inspired by the legislature's concern for the
issuer rather than the investor.").
236. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
238. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1164.
239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
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Takeover Legislation as Promoting Management Interests: A
Case Study of the Delaware Takeover Statute

In examining the impact of the takeover phenomenon on the
market for corporate charters, the question is not whether the market will respond, but rather, how it has responded. Given Delaware's
uncontested position as the leading corporate law state, its enactment of a takeover statute can be viewed as a definitive indication
that the market tends to promote the adoption of takeover
legislation.
At the same time, however, if the market for charters is promoting takeover legislation, it remains uncertain why Delaware was so
slow to pass a statute.240 Indeed, at least twenty-seven other states
had adopted takeover legislation before the traditional leader of the
corporate world finally adopted its own."4
As previously explained, the speed with which many of these
states acted may be attributable to a protectionist motivation; that
the enacting states simply may have felt compelled to protect a large
local employer.2 Delaware, by contrast, may never have faced a
comparable situation.
But why, if the chartering market eventually compelled Delaware to adopt a statute, did the market not do so earlier? The answer, it seems, has two parts. One part concerns the market for corporate charters. The other part concerns the unique position of
Delaware as the leader in that market.
As to the first point, a strong argument can be made that, until
the Supreme Court issued its decision in CTS, there was probably
little pressure in the market for corporate charters to enact takeover
legislation. The reasons for this are twofold. First, prior to CTS,
takeover legislation was being routinely invalidated by courts under
the reasoning of the earlier MITE decision. 243 Thus, it seems un240. Delaware was also apparently slow in passing its first generation statute. See Romano, supra note 12, at 141. The original first generation statute was enacted by Virginia in
1968. See Comment, The Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act After Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 347 (1985) (authored by Bradford J. Shafer). However, Delaware
did not adopt a first generation statute until 1976. See C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note
130, at 5 n.8.
241. See C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, at 3; Joint Hearings, supra note 136,
at 4 (testimony of Delaware Secretary of State Michael E. Harkins), reprinted in C. SMITH &
C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. Q at 258.
242. See supra notes 140-49, 159-64 and accompanying text.
243. See C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, at 5; supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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likely that corporations would have been making decisions as to
where to incorporate based upon legislation of such dubious legality.
Second, and as previously mentioned, some states, compelled by
a motivation to protect local employers, were willing to enact legislation that applied to foreign corporations.244 Such legislation would
also take pressure off the market for corporate charters since companies could get takeover protection even without reincorporating.
As to the second point, concerning Delaware's unique position
as the leading corporate law state, takeover legislation may simply
have been one instance in which a piece of corporate law was so
politically explosive that, even if the market for corporate charters
was to encourage its enactment, as indeed it ultimately did, the sensitivity of the legislation would cause Delaware to put off its adoption as long as possible (in other words, as long as it seemed that it
was not likely to lose much of its chartering business by not acting).
From Delaware's standpoint, takeover legislation could be "explosive" in two respects. First, as the leading corporate law state, it
is likely to be the state of incorporation not only for corporations
seeking protection from takeovers, but also for acquiring corporations. Deciding whether to adopt a statute, therefore, would ultimately have to upset one of these constituencies.24
More important, however, is that given Delaware's position as
the state of incorporation for many of the nation's leading corporations, the adoption of takeover legislation could spawn preemptive
legislation by a federal government unsympathetic to such legislation. 246 Federal intervention into the arena of corporate law, of
course, poses the greatest single threat to Delaware's chartering business. Delaware, therefore, would have every incentive to delay adoption of a takeover statute, at least until the pressures in the market
for corporate charters became so great that failure to adopt a statute
posed an even greater threat to the state's chartering business.247
This is apparently what occurred once the Supreme Court issued its decision in CTS. The reasons are obvious. First, by upholding a second generation statute, CTS suddenly gave credibility to
244. See supra notes 54, 107, 153-58, 160 and accompanying text (discussing the jurisdictional reach of some state takeover statutes to foreign corporations).
245. See Romano, supra note 12, at 141.
246. See infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
247. For another possible example of Delaware corporate law responding to the threat of
federal preemption, see R. GILSON, supra note 159, at 870-83 (suggesting that the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), may have
been intended to quell a strengthening movement to federalize corporate law).
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such legislation and thus made it a matter which corporations could
reasonably consider in their incorporation decisions.2 4 Second, for
all of the deference which the CTS decision gave to state corporate
lawmaking, that deference appears to have been limited to lawmaking involving a state's domestic corporations. 249 Thus, the decision
made highly suspect any takeover legislation which extended its jurisdiction to foreign corporations.25 0 This also reinforced the importance of takeover legislation in deciding where to incorporate.
In fact, Delaware began to show interest in adopting a takeover
statute almost immediately after the CTS decision was handed
down.2 5 1 At first, a Committee of the State Bar Association, which
was responsible for developing a proposed bill for the legislature,
considered the adoption of a control share acquisition statute
modeled after the Indiana Act that was upheld in CTS.25 2 Eventually, however, the Committee rejected such a bill, and, after several
more months of deliberation, settled on a modified version of the
New York business combination statute, which was ultimately enacted into law.253
1. The Delaware Business Combination Statute.- Like the
New York business combination statute, 254 the Delaware statute provides that an acquiror who obtains a certain percentage of ownership
of a domestic corporation is prohibited from engaging in a "business
combination" with the corporation, such as a merger, for a certain
period of years.255 As is true with the New York statute, this prohibition will not apply if the acquiror, prior to making its acquisition,
obtains approval from the target's board for either the acquisition or
2 6
the anticipated business combination.
While similar in form, the two statutes vary slightly in both
248. See supra note 233 (describing the concern after the CTS decision that corporations would reincorporate outside of Delaware if the state did not adopt a second generation

statute).
249.
250.

See supra note 220.
See supra note 220.
251. C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, at 8.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 8-10.
254. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989); see supra notes 99103 and accompanying text (discussing briefly the New York statute).
255. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney 1986) (providing a five-year
moratorium) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (Supp. 1988) (providing a three-year

moratorium).
256.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 203(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP.

LAW § 912

(b), (c)(1) (McKinney 1986).
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their triggering requirements and prohibitions. The New York statute, for instance, is only triggered by a purchase of twenty percent of
a target company's stock, 25 7 whereas the Delaware statute is trig-

gered by a purchase of fifteen percent.258 The Delaware statute,
however, only bars an acquiror from engaging in a business combination with the target for a period of three years, 59 whereas the
prohibition under the New York statute is five years.260
The most significant difference between the two statutes, however, is that the Delaware statute provides several important excep-

tions whereby an acquiror can avoid the prohibition on business combinations, without having to obtain prior approval from the target's
board. Two exceptions are particularly noteworthy. First, if the acquiror obtains eighty-five percent of the target's outstanding voting
stock (exclusive of management stock) in the same transaction in
which it passes the fifteen percent mark, then the statute's prohibitions do not apply. 261 Second, an exception is triggered if the business combination is approved by the target's board of directors and

by shareholders owning two-thirds of the shares not owned by the
acquiror any time after the acquiror passes the fifteen percent
threshold.262
2. Evidence of a Management Entrenchment Motivation.- The
view that the Delaware statute should be perceived as management

entrenchment legislation and not shareholder protection is suggested
by the legislative history underlying the Act. Virtually every "shareholder protection" rationale put forward for the legislation is belied
257. N.Y, Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(10)(A) (McKinney 1986).
258. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5) (Supp. 1988).

259. Id. § 203(a).
260. NY Bus. CORP.

§ 912(b) (McKinney 1986).
§ 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1988). Also excluded in determining
whether an acquiror has obtained 85% of the voting stock are shares owned by "employee
stock plans in which employee participants do not have the right to determine confidentially
whether shares held subject to the plan will be tendered in a tender or exchange offer." Id.
While management counselor Martin Lipton of New York's Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz described this as a "barn-door size" exception, see Grundfest Letter, supra note 130, at
7, reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supranote 130, app. E at 167 (quoting Memorandum
from Martin Lipton to Clients (Nov. 23, 1987)), it is not clear exactly how important it will be
in practice. When the statute was first proposed, for instance, the exception would only apply
if an acquiror obtained 90% of the target's outstanding stock. At that time, the Securities and
Exchange Commission reviewed all hostile tender offers between 1982 and 1987 and discovered that no offeror had ever achieved such a large majority in its initial acquisition. See
Grundfest Letter, supra note 130 at 7-8, reprintedin C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130,
app. E at 167-68; R. GILSON, supra note 159, at 322-23 (Supp. 1988).
262. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Supp. 1988).
261.

LAW

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
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by the legislation itself, which goes far beyond what is necessary to
accomplish any of the stated goals. Such overkill, with its concomitant effect of discouraging hostile takeovers, suggests that the real
object of the legislation is management entrenchment.
The official justification given for the Delaware legislation is to
protect shareholders from coercive two-tiered offers. A spokesperson
for the Delaware Bar Association, which was responsible for drafting
the Delaware legislation, described the legislation's purpose as
follows:
I believe we have succeeded in bringing to the General Assembly
for your consideration a balanced proposal which, rather than inhibiting legitimate takeover activity as some other states have done,
is narrowly targeted to address a limited category of takeover
abuses which have been repeatedly recognized both by the U.S.
Supreme Court and as recently as three months ago by our Delaware Supreme Court. Transactions in which offerors seek to take
advantage of the power that we have given to them under our law
of a bare majority stockholder to cash out the minority to coerce
stockholders into selling their stock at a price which is less than
that which stockholders would receive in a free and uncoerced
63
market.
The Delaware legislation, however, goes far beyond what is necessary to accomplish this goal. If the purpose of the legislation is to
protect shareholders from two-tiered offers, a fair price statute would
seem to easily suffice, while at the same time having much less of an
anti-takeover effect. 64 Why, it must be asked, is it necessary, in or263. Joint Hearings, supra note 136, at 2-3 (statement of Delaware State Bar Association Corporation Law Section Chairman A. Gilchrist Sparks III), reprinted in C. SMITH & C.
FURLOW, supra note 130, app. Y at 298. This rationale was echoed in the testimony of many
corporate managers who testified before the Delaware legislature. See, e.g., Joint Hearings
supra note 136 (statement of Household International Senior Vice President and General
Counsel J. Richard Hull); Joint Hearings,supra note 136 (statement of General Mills Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Bruce Atwater). Shareholder protection was also assumed to
be the legislature's rationale by a federal district court in Delaware which refused to enjoin the
application of the statute. BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 468 (D. Del. 1988)
(stating that "[tihe purpose of the Delaware legislation, as presented in the synopsis to the act
and in certain testimony during the hearings, is to protect shareholders from the coercive aspects of some tender offers."). See generally C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, at 3
(stating that "[t]he particular evil to which the statute is directed is the use of two-tiered,
highly leveraged takeovers.").
264. See Joint Hearings,supra note 136 (testimony of Fidelity Investments Senior Vice
President and General Counsel Robert C. Pozen). Mr. Pozen testified:
The bill appears to be a response to concerns that "two-tier" tender offers may
be coercive. If so, the focus of the bill should be sharpened: much less sweeping
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der to protect shareholders in this context, to prevent an acquiror

from being able to accomplish a variety of business combinations for
a period of three years?265
Moreover, as a number of commentators have pointed out, if
shareholders feel that they need protection from coercive offers, they

are able to protect themselves through appropriate charter amendments.2 66 Fair price provisions, for example, have been enacted by
numerous corporations.2 67 The fact that Delaware chose to protect

shareholders in an instance when shareholders could have protected
provisions could protect shareholders during two-tier offers. As drafted, the bill is so
broad that management may block shareholders from accepting even offers
favorable to all shareholders.
For example, the bill should not impose restrictions on a bidder that acquires
51 % of the company's outstanding stock if the bidder undertakes to pay equivalent
consideration to the remaining shareholders in a second-step merger. There is nothing coercive about such an offer.
Id. at 6. SEC Commissioner Charles C. Cox similarly stated:
The focus of Delaware's concern in proposing this legislation at issue appears to
be "coercive" takeovers, where minority shareholders are "squeezed out" on unfavorable terms. Although the incidence of third-party two-tier tender offers is limited
and their adverse or coercive effects open to debate, if Delaware believes that they
present shareholder protection concerns, then the legislation should specifically restrict two-tier offers and not restrict offers which do not present these concerns. If
legislation were to eliminate the coercive nature of front-end loaded bids by providing that shareholders in a second step takeout would be assured of receiving the
same compensation, then shareholders would be in a position to reasonably assess
the economic merits of an offer and could accept it or reject it accordingly.
Cox Letter, supra note 137, at 2-3, reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app.
D at 158-59 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
265. A perfect example of how the Delaware statute can serve to discourage takeovers
even when there is no threat of coercion is shown in BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp.
458 (D. Del. 1988), where a federal district court upheld the constitutionality of the Delaware
statute. In that case, the statute would bar the acquiror, BNS, from engaging in a business
combination with Koppers for a period of three years. This three-year moratorium was held to
be valid, although the BNS offer for Koppers stock was not a two-tiered offer, see id. at 461
(noting that BNS's offer was for "all" of Koppers' outstanding securities), and even though
under BNS's proposed business combination, any shareholders who did not tender and were
squeezed out in a second step merger were to "receive the same cash price paid pursuant to the
tender offer." Id.; see also RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476,
477 (D. Del. 1988). In RP Acquisition, the court refused to enjoin application of the Delaware statute even though the acquiror, RP Acquisition Corp., was making a tender offer for
"any or all" of Staley's common stock and "[ujnder the terms of the anticipated merger, each
Staley common share would be converted into the right to receive the same cash price paid

pursuant to the tender offer."
266.

See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 12, at 105; Romano, supra note 12, at 188-89.

See generally I A. FLEISCHER,

TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES. RESPONSES, AND PLANNING

33-38

(Supp. 1987) (discussing various charter amendments).

267. See V. ROSENBAUM,

TAKEOVER DEFENSES: PROFILES OF THE FORTUNE

500, at 209-

10 (1987).
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themselves raises the possiblity that the shareholders may not have

wanted the legislation being foisted on them "for their benefit. ' '2 68

Indeed, Delaware compounded this problem by providing that

corporations must opt out of its takeover legislation, rather than requiring them to opt in.2 69 This again results in foisting the legislation
on shareholders who may be too disorganized and dispersed to exer-

cise their right to opt out.270 Moreover, if the legislation is in fact
intended to protect managers from hostile takeovers, managers will
not likely take the initiative themselves to sponsor an opt-out
amendment.
Though other rationales for the Delaware legislation surfaced

during the legislative hearings for the bill, once again the legislation
belies the credibility of these explanations. One such rationale, for
instance, was to protect shareholders from partial offers by insuring
that an acquiror could not buy a controlling interest in a company
and then exploit the company's assets for its own benefit and at the
expense of the remaining minority shareholders. 1
Again, however, there would seem to be less burdensome means
for accomplishing the stated purpose. Most obviously, a control share
cash-out statute, which compels acquirors to redeem the shares of
the minority shareholders at a fair price, would adequately protect
268. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at 105-06; see also Romano, supra note 12, at 18081 (suggesting that managers will turn to state legislators for takeover legislation only when
they think they would not receive a favorable shareholder vote for a charter provision).
269. DEL CODE ANN. tit 8, § 203(b)(2) (Supp. 1988). There was a bill before the Delaware legislature which would have made the takeover statute an enabling "opt-in" statute, but
the Delaware State Bar Association fervently opposed it. See Joint Hearings, supra note 136,
at 4-7 (statement of Delaware State Bar Association Corporation Law Section Chairman A.
Gilchrist Sparks III), reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. Y at 299300. One argument against an "opt-in" provision was that a management request that shareholders vote to opt in would signal to the marketplace that their company was a target and
raiders would move in before shareholders could even approve the provision. Id. SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest argued, however, that corporations had long been going to their
shareholders for bylaw and charter provisions which would impede takeovers (such as staggered board provisions) and this had not triggered attacks by raiders. See Joint Hearings,
supra note 136, at 8-10 (statement of SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest), reprintedin

NEW DELAWARE TAKEOVER STATUTE
DELAWARE TAKEOVER STATUTE].

PRACTISING LAW INsT., THE

inafter THE NEW

133, 150-51 (1988) [here-

270.

See Joint Hearings, supra note 136, at 8-11 (statement of SEC Commissioner JoDELAWARE TAKEOVER STATUTE, supra note 269, at
133, 150-51.
271. See Joint Hearings, supra note 136, at 3-5 (statement of General Mills Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer Bruce Atwater). See generally Booth, supra note 12, at 1641-42
(discussing the coercive effect of partial offers).

seph A. Grundfest, reprinted in THE NEW
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shareholders from partial offers.2 7' At the same time, it would not
prevent acquirors from engaging in possibly needed business combinations for three years.
Similarly, a control share acquisition statute would eliminate
the coerciveness of partial offers by allowing the shareholders to decide collectively, before approving the acquiror's initial acquisition,
whether the acquiror's front-end price was sufficiently high so as to
justify any loss shareholders might endure as continuing minority
shareholders. 7 0 The primary advantage of this approach, as at least
one commentator has noted, is that it leaves the decision as to what
274

is best for the shareholders in the shareholders' hands.

By contrast, the Delaware statute leaves the decision as to what

is best for the shareholders in the hands of management. 75 Indeed,
press reports suggested that Delaware initially decided to reject a
control share acquisition model precisely because of speculation that
such legislation actually makes takeovers easier, since shareholders
tend to benefit from takeovers and are likely to vote in favor of an
acquiror's purchases. 276 By taking the decision away from shareholders and placing it in the hands of management, the Delaware legislation again seems biased in favor of management.2 7
272. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing control share cash-out
statutes).
273. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing control share acquisition
statutes).
274. See Booth, supra note 12, at 1682-85 (noting the benefits of shareholder voting in
takeover statutes). Professor Booth argues that business combination statutes do not "directly
address partial offers," id. at 1675, and worse yet, "prohibit[] some bids which clearly are
noncoercive and beneficial." Id. at 1676.
275. See DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(I) (Supp. 1988).
276. See, e.g.. Black, Why Delaware is Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, Wall St. J., July
10, 1987, at 18, col. 3. Mr. Black, a member of the Delaware State Bar Association's Corporation Law Section, expressed the concern as follows:
[Wouldn't the result [of a control share acquisition statute] be a stockholder plebiscite on every offer, and wouldn't the stockholder vote always favor the bidder or
any new bidder that offered a greater premium? It did not seem to the committee to
matter that the Indiana law precluded the bidder (as well as management) from
voting. It seemed likely that institutions would vote for a short-term profit. So would
arbitragers who could acquire shares before the record date for the stockholders
meeting or purchase shares with proxies attached.
Id. See generally R. GILSON, supra note 159, at 308-12 (Supp. 1988) (discussing the effectiveness of control share acquisition provisions).
277. The statute does permit an acquiror to sell assets to third parties during the three
year waiting period, as long as receipts from those sales are distributed to all shareholders
proportionately. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3)(ii) (Supp. 1988). Although this might
seem an appropriate method for insuring that shareholders receive the full value of their shares
in the corporation, while at the same time allowing acquirors to make use of their acquisition,
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Lastly, a much more provocative rationale given for the Dela-

ware legislation was that it was needed to further much broader
public policy interests in promoting long-term corporate planning,
and in protecting employees and their communities from the disloca-

tive effects of takeovers.
favor of the statute. 79

8

Several unions, for instance, testified in

While such concerns are indeed important and deserve considerably more attention, it is questionable whether they can or should be
addressed by states in the context of corporate law. Specifically,
there would seem to be no credible explanation, under any theory of

state corporate lawmaking, as to why states competing for chartering
business would be likely to properly consider the interests of non-

shareholder corporate constituencies or the national economy.
Most important, if those who favor state regulation of corporate
law are correct, then that would mean the market for charters promotes corporate laws which maximize shareholder welfare.28 0 What
it arguably goes far beyond what is necessary for shareholder protection by encouraging shareholders to freely ride on the efficiencies achieved through the efforts of acquirors. See
Grundfest Letter, supra note 130, at 12-13, reprintedin C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note
130, app. E at 172-73. For a general discussion of the free rider problem facing corporate
acquirors, see R. GILSON, supra note 159, at 854-932.
278. See, e.g., Joint Hearings,supra note 136, at 4-6 (testimony of Delaware Secretary
of State Michael E. Harkins), reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. Q at
259; Joint Hearings, supra note 136, at 1-8 (testimony of Irving S. Shapiro), reprinted in C.
SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. R at 262; Statement by Governor Michael N.
Castle Regarding House Substitute 1 for House Bill 396 (Feb. 2, 1988), reprinted in C SMITH
& C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. CC at 339-40.
279. See supra note 136 (noting that labor groups actively lobbied for antitakeover
legislation).
280. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 919-20; Romano, supra note 9, at 711; Winter, supra
note 7.
If the "race to the bottom" theorists are correct, that fact, in and of itself, would give
cause for federal intervention. Nevertheless, one might suggest that even if the market for
charters has a management bias, that bias is good since the extra leeway the law would afford
managers would allow managers to act as proxies to protect the interests of nonshareholder
corporate constituencies or society at large. Such a broad investment of power into the hands
of management, however, would seem unjustifiable. See 3 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 82 (1982). Hayek states:
So long as the management has the one overriding duty of administering the resources under its control as trustees for the shareholders and for their benefit, its
hands are largely tied; and it will have no arbitrary power to benefit this or that
particular interest. But once the management of a big enterprise is regarded as not
only entitled but even obliged to consider in its decisions whatever is regarded as the
public or social interest, or to support good causes and generally to act for the public benefit, it gains indeed an uncontrollable power-a power which could not long
be left in the hands of private managers but would inevitably be made the subject of
increasing public control.
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is best for shareholders, however, is not necessarily what is best for
nonshareholder corporate constituencies such as employees and resident communities, or for that matter, what is best for the economy
at large.28 ' Indeed, at the same time that employees have been hurt
by the takeover phenomenon, shareholders have often enjoyed
fabulously high premiums. 82 If there is a need to protect these nonshareholder constituencies, it is best done through labor, contract or
pension laws, or through severance pay or plant closing laws, rather
than through corporate law.283
Id.; see also R. GiLSON, supra note 159, at 758; Karmel, Will Takeover Abuses Lead to
Federal CorporationLaw?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1 n.43 (noting that although the
business community vigorously fought the corporate social responsibility movement of the
1970s, it is now fervently arguing that managers must have a right to protect nonshareholder
constituencies from corporate raiders). Commisioner Grundfest has similarly observed:
Management's position on the job loss and takeover issue is quite intriguing. On one
hand, managements opposed to takeovers often point to the spectre of job loss and
local plant shutdowns or headquarters moves as a reason to fight takeover activity.
On the other hand, managements vigorously protest legislative efforts that would
restrain their ability to lay off workers, shut down plants, or move headquarters
when and as management likes.
Address by SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest, University of Toledo College of Law 5
(Mar. 11, 1988) (transcript on file at Hofstra Law Review). The Delaware statute is actually
better explained as management entrenchment legislation (which would comport with the
"race to the bottom" theory) than as legislation designed to consider the needs of employees or
communities, or the economy at large. See infra text accompanying notes 284-87.
281. In fact, shareholders are frequently considered the culprits for many of the
problems associated with takeovers. Institutional shareholders, for instance, are often accused
of concentrating solely on short term price maximization, and consequently for fueling
"merger mania." See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 88, at 7-9; CuoMo MEMORANDUM, supra note
101, at 7.
282. After Texaco's acquisition of Getty Oil, for instance, 2,000 workers (26% of
Getty's workforce) were dismissed. See Schmitt, Depleted Field: Despite Raider's Lust, Oil
Industry is FacingRetrenchment Period,Wall St. J., June 7, 1985, at I, col. 6, 15, col. 3. By
contrast, the shareholders who sold to Texaco received a very substantial premium for their
shares. Gelfand, "Pun's Oil Sues Toxico": A Comedy of Errors in (At Least) Four Acts, 11
DEL J. CORP. L. 345, 349 (1986).

Similarly, Owens Corning dismissed 46 percent of its workforce (including 480 research
employees) after engaging in a "frantic recapitalization" to fend off the Wickes Companies.
Willoughby, What a Raider Hath Wrought, FORBES, Mar. 23, 1987, at 56. As part of the
recapitalization, however, shareholders, whose shares had been selling for approximately $40
per share, received a combination of cash and bonds valued at over $70. Id.; Aristof, Wickes
Drops Owen-Corning Offer, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1986, § 1, at 31, col. 3.
283. The above discussion is not intended to deny the importance of such issues as takeover-related dislocation, or the effects of leveraging on the national economy. See Impact on
Workers of Takeovers, Leveraged Buyouts, Corporate Restructuring, and Greenmail: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations,House of Representatives, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1987) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of Dr. Richard S. Belous)
(testifying that "increased merger and acquisition activity has tended to lower compensation
trends ... [and] reduce employment levels." (emphasis in original)); Id. at 42 (statement of
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More to the point, however, these broader public policy rationales for the Delaware statute ring hollow when one considers that

the legislation only discourages hostile acquirors from engaging in
leveraging or dislocative conduct, but does nothing to insure that
AFL-CIO representative) (testifying to job loss in member unions attributable to the takeover
phenomenon). But see Joint Hearings, supra note 136, at 7 (statement of SEC Commissioner
Joseph A. Grundfest) (stating that "[t]he best available evidence indicates that takeovers do
not systematically decrease aggregate employment."); Yago & Stevenson, Mergers and Acquisitions in the New Jersey Economy I (State University of New York at Stonybrook, Economic
Research Bureau) (May 8, 1986) (report on file at Hofstra Law Review) (finding no impact
on employment levels in New Jersey due to takeovers); C. BROWN & J.MEDOFF, THE IMPACT
OF FIRM ACQUISITIONS ON LABOR,

in

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISI-

(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2273, 1987) (finding
"small (and sometimes positive) changes in wages and employment levels in Michigan due to
takeovers).
The question, instead, is how these concerns should be addressed. It has been suggested
that state corporate law is not the proper forum, primarily because the current system, in
which corporations can opt in and out of corporate law regimes and in which states compete
for chartering business, is not likely to produce laws which will properly address these concerns. Even if the system operates efficiently, it will only serve to maximize shareholder wealth,
and not to properly consider the interests of other corporate constituencies or the economy at
large. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, these issues still can be addressed by legislators both on federal and state
levels. On the federal level, for instance, Congress could consider limits on leveraging if leveraging is thought to encourage harmful short-term business planning or dislocative conduct.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 207 (1986) (setting forth the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation
that its existing margin requirements are applicable to junk bond financing); Lipton, supra
note 88, at 9-I1 (discussing how the tax laws have encouraged leveraged acquisitions). Similarly, in an effort to help ease the dislocation of corporate employees, Congress could consider,
inter alia, amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, such as making the decision to
close a plant a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Cf. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding that an employer's decision to close part of its operations is not a mandatory subject of bargaining). Additionally, Congress could enact changes in
pension laws, or, for those with more radical tastes, require employee representation on corporate boards. See Bonanno, Employee Codetermination:Origins in Germany, Present Practice
in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 947 (1977); Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 1.
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155 (1982); Note, Employee Representative on the Corporate
Board of Directors:Implications Under Labor, Antitrust and Corporate Law, 27 WAYNE L
REV. 367 (1980) (authored by Barbara A. Zeile). Congress recently enacted legislation requiring advance notice of plant closings. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109).
On the state level but outside the corporate law context, state legislatures could consider a
variety of means of easing dislocation, such as plant closing or severance pay laws. See generally Douglas, State and Local Plant Closing Laws: The Case Against Preemption, 21 GONZ,
L. REV. 603 (1986) (advocating plant closing regulations to ease the impact of plant closings
on workers); Note, supra note 216, at 253-55 (proposing and analyzing state plant closing
legislation as an alternative to federal legislation). One commentator has suggested that a
state's tort of wrongful discharge could be construed so as to require notice of layoffs or plant
closings. See Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effects on Employees-Adaptation of the
Tort of Wrongful Discharge, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 362 (1986).
TIONS
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current management does not engage in the same behavior. Would it
be likely, for instance, under the Delaware statute, that a company's
board would not approve a management-led leveraged buyout, even
though it could just as easily as a third-party acquisition, result in
employee layoffs and short-term business planning? 14 Similarly, the
statute would not even apply if current managers simply decided to
leverage their company through a recapitalization. This is a very
common phenomenon, which also can have the effect of encouraging
short-term business planning and employee layoffs. 285 This one-sided
bias of the Delaware statute again supports the management entrenchment explanation for the legislation.
Finally, the testimony submitted to the Delaware state legislature when it was considering the takeover statute also suggests that
the statute was intended to benefit managers rather than shareholders. Virtually every shareholder group opposed adoption of the legislation, and vociferously opposed the requirement that companies
must opt-out of the legislation. 286 The testimony of Steven Cohen on
behalf of New York City Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin, the trus284. For example, in response to a hostile bid by the Haft family, the Safeway management engineered a management-led buy-out with the help of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.
House Hearings, supra note 283, at 45 (statement of AFL-CIO representative). After the
acquisition, Safeway closed numerous stores resulting in layoffs of 3,000 to 4,000 employees.
Id.; see also Bernstein, Labor: Workers May Pay the Price in Safeway Sale, L.A. Times, Dec.
15, 1987, pt. 4, at 1, col. 1 (noting that "[m]ore than 8,500 Safeway workers lost their jobs
after [Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.] first moved in last year to save Safeway from the
clutches of the father-son team of Herbert H. Haft and Robert M. Haft of Landover, Md.").
285. See Hearings Before a Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1987) (statement of President
James E. Hatfield of the International Glass, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Union) (testifying that the restructuring by Owens-Corning management resulted in layoffs of over 1000
employees); see also Coffee, supra note 214, at 6 (stating that "between January 1984 and
mid-July 1985, 398 of North America's 850 largest corporations engaged in ... restructurings
Restructuring is the Name of the Hurricane, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1987, at
); Thackray,
.....
106 (noting that "well over half of the top 800 corporations have restructured significantly in
the past four years.").
286. See, e.g., Joint Hearings,supra note 136 (testimony of Office of the Comptroller of
the City of New York Deputy Counsel Steven A. Cohen); id. (testimony of Robert A.G.
Monks on behalf of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., on behalf of Alliance Capital
Management, California Public Employees Retirement System, FMR Corporation, New
Jersey Division of Investment, Pension Reserves Investment Management Board, California
State Teachers Retirement System, Wells Fargo Bank, College Retirement Equities Fund and
the California Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholders Rights and Securities Transactions); id. (testimony of Bruce 0. Kallos as Trustee for the Delaware state pension
system); id. (testimony of United Shareholders Association Executive Director James E.
Heard); id. (testimony of Fidelity Investments Senior Vice President and General Counsel
Robert C. Pozen).
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tee of five New York City public employee pension funds and the cochairman of the Council of Institutional Investors, is exemplary:
There is no evidence that stockholders fare worse in hostile
takeovers than in mergers arranged by management. Quite to the
contrary, available data suggests the value of their holdings increase by as much as 40%.
Nor is there evidence that hostile takeovers are rampant. Or
that they cut research and development or any of the other horrible

outcomes about which you have been warned.
Clearly, though, they do pose a threat to corporate manage-

ment. Management says they need protection from that threat. But
why? Certainly not to protect us stockholders, which should be
their primary job. As stockholders, we reject the notion that we
need protection from ourselves. But we do need protection
of our
87
basic rights. And that is why we oppose this legislation.1
While it has been argued that the politics of the Delaware statute tend to suggest that the legislation is better characterized as
management entrenchment rather than shareholder protection, it
should be noted how restrained the Delaware legislature was in pursuing the former objective. Most notably, the Delaware statute poses
much less of a burden on takeovers, and is thus much less effective
as a management entrenchment tool, than the New York statute after which it was modeled. As previously noted, the New York statute
bars business combinations for five years, whereas the Delaware statute only bars such activity for three years.288 Even more significantly, the Delaware statute, unlike the New York statute, has many
significant exceptions by which an acquiror can avoid the statute's
prohibitions, without having to get prior approval from the target
company's board of directors. 8
Delaware's restraint should not be construed as an indication
that the market for corporate charters does not lean in favor of management interests. Rather, its restraint is probably best explained by
Delaware's concern with a federal preemptive response should its
legislation be deemed too protective of management. Such federal
action, in fact, seemed perfectly plausible at the time Delaware was
considering its statute-Congress had recently considered a bill that
287. Id. at 2-3 (testimony of Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York Deputy
Counsel Steven A. Cohen).
288. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
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would preempt state takeover legislation,"'0 the Reagan Administra-

tion voiced its opposition to the Delaware statute,2 9 ' and prominent
members of the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested that
2 92
Delaware's adoption of a statute might provoke preemptive action.
Indeed, the fact that Delaware enacted a takeover statute despite

this very tangible threat of federal preemption is a good indication of
how powerfully the forces in the market for corporate charters
pushed for such legislation. 93
B.

Federal Limitations on Corporate Law: Responding to the
Management Bias in the CharteringMarket

If the market for corporate charters is, in fact, promoting management entrenchment legislation, then some form of federal corrective action would seem appropriate. Such legislation is both in conflict with the very raison d'etre of corporate law-to minimize the

agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control-and with the interests of the nation at large. By sheltering

managers from corporate takeovers, the legislation takes away what
many commentators believe is the primary check on management
behavior, and additionally, the primary incentive for managers to
run their companies efficiently. 9
290. See Witnesses at Takeover Bill Hearing Split on Preemption of State Regulation,
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 851 (June 12, 1987).
291. See Joint Hearings,supra note 136, at 6 (statement of SEC Commissioner Joseph
A. Grundfest) (including a letter to the Delaware legislature from Chairman Berryl Sprinkle
expressing the views of the Council of Economic Advisors), reprinted in THE NEw DELAWARE
TAKEOVER STATUTE, supra note 269, at 142-43..
292. See Grundfest Letter, supra note 130, at 5, reprintedin C. SMITH & C. FURLOW,
supra note 130, app. E at 165 (stating that "[ilt is clear ... that a decision by Delaware to
adopt an antitakeover statute will be subject to far greater scrutiny and debate, and is more
likely to provoke a federal response .... "). SEC Commissioner David S. Ruder also stated:
Limitations on the free transferability of securities of corporations which are owned
by shareholders nationwide diminish the efficiency, depth, and liquidity of the nation's securities markets. Accordingly, I believe that Federal law should control in
that area by preempting state statutes that unduly interfere with the free transferability of securities.
Address by SEC Chairman David S. Ruder, 26th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 7, 1987), quoted in Letter from SEC Chairman David S. Ruder to E. Norman
Veasey, Esq. (Dec. 8, 1987), reprinted in C. SMITH & C. FURLOW, supra note 130, app. C at
155, 155.
293. Delaware's restraint in enacting the takeover statute should not be exaggerated,
however. Most important, while Delaware's statute might be restrained by comparison to the
New York business combination statute, it is still probably more likely to discourage takeovers
than many of the other types of second generation takeover legislation, any of which could
have been chosen by the Delaware legislature.
294. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11; Gilson, supra note 11.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

59

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:535

How, then, should the federal government respond to such legislation? To begin with, it must be recognized that surgical removal of
specific statutes, as suggested for protectionist takeover legislation, is
not appropriate. To the contrary, the lesson of management entrenchment takeover legislation is that the system of state corporate
lawmaking itself is not properly regulating the takeover phenomenon. Absent some federal remedial action, the market for corporate
charters will continue to prompt states to adopt takeover laws which
are adverse to shareholders' interests.
The more difficult question, however, is how extensive federal
action should be. Admittedly, some commentators might consider
the management bias in takeover legislation as simply more proof of
the "race to the bottom" theory, and thus merely additional evidence
of the need for extensive federalization of corporate law. 95 But while
such a reading has surface appeal, it may be inferring too much
from the legislation. Most important, it ignores the argument that
minimal federal intervention in the takeover context might be sufficient to remedy any other management bias problems in the chartering market.
Specifically, the primary distinction between those who favor
and those who oppose federalization of corporate law is a belief in
the effectiveness of market forces in compelling managers to act in
the best interests of shareholders. 96 Opponents of federalization generally concede that managers typically make the decision as to where
to incorporate. 97 Their distinguishing characteristic is that they believe that market forces compel managers to choose a state of incorporation which best serves the interests of shareholders. 98
Commentators opposing federalization rely in large part on the
market for corporate control. 99 Stated succinctly, the scholars believe that if managers select corporate laws which promote their own
interests at the expense of shareholders, their company's stock price
will decline and their company will become a takeover target. 00
Such a belief suggests that the federal government might be
295. For an example of a possible "race to the bottom" in another area of corporate law,
see Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap,
66 N.C.L. REv. 171 (1987) (discussing statutory provisions limiting director liability).
296. See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text (discussing the debate over federalization of corporate law).
297. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 7, at 252.
298. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
299. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 919; Winter, supra note 7, at 264-70.
300. Winter, supra note 7, at 256.
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able to remedy the management bias in the chartering market simply by restricting state takeover regulation. If the federal government preserves a relatively unimpeded market for corporate control,
that market itself might eliminate any other management bias in the
chartering market. Indeed, even the proponents of state regulation
have argued that federal regulation of takeovers might be
necessary. 30 '
If such minimal federal intervention would be sufficient, it
would seem preferable. States, after all, have longstanding experience as corporate lawmakers. Absent more convincing evidence that
the state system as a whole is malfunctioning, the federal government should defer as much as possible to state regulation.
What, however, should be the nature of this "minimal" federal
intervention? Simply requiring that takeover legislation assume an
"opt-in" format instead of an "opt-out" format should be sufficient
to correct for any problems.302 If states enact legislation that promotes management and not shareholder interests, then shareholders
will not likely opt into the legislation.303 Moreover, if the legislation
does in fact properly promote shareholder welfare, then shareholders
would happily vote to opt-in. 04 Most importantly, such an enabling
format avoids the problem of having takeover legislation foisted upon
shareholders against their will.30 5
1. Fashioning a Response: Judicial versus Legislative Action.The simplest and most obvious choice for federal intervention to correct for the management bias in takeover legislation would be for
Congress to enact legislation which would require that state takeover
legislation adopt an enabling format. Before doing this, however,
Congress should wait to see whether the new takeover legislation,
301. See. e.g., id. at 289.
302. See Joint Hearings, supra note 136, at 8-11 (statement of SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest) (discussing the merits of an "opt-in" or enabling approach over an "optout" approach); see also Note, supra note 12, at 221 (arguing that "implementation of antitakeover legislation by a corporation should require the concurrence of a majority of the shareholders since it materially alters the factors upon which shareholders relied when they invested

in the corporation.").
303.

See Joint Hearings,supra note 136, at 10 (statement of SEC Commissioner Joseph

A. Grundfest).
304.

See id. SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest reasoned that: "[i~f the proposed

[Delaware] antitakeover measures are beneficial for stockholders, then stockholders will support those measures and they will be adopted, just as hundreds of corporations have gained
stockholder approval for fair price amendments, staggered boards, and numerous other take-

over protections." Id.
305.

Id. at 8-11; see supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
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and in particular the Delaware statute, actually interferes significantly with takeover activity. As already noted, the mere threat of
federal preemption went a long way toward ameliorating the antitakeover effect of the Delaware statute,30 6 and market forces may
prove sufficiently powerful to overcome any obstacles which the legislation continues to create.
Even in the absence of federal legislative action, however, courts
could conceivably play a role in correcting for the management bias
in state takeover regulation. While it has already been seen how the
Commerce Clause could be used to correct for the problem of protectionist legislation, 0 7 the Clause could also be used to invalidate
state legislation which is not protectionist, but which is intended to
entrench management.
Quite simply, courts could revive the Commerce Clause balancing test which the Supreme Court employed in Edgar v. MITE
Corp.3 0 8 As previously noted, in the MITE decision, Justice White
assumed that an open market for corporate control was itself an important national interest, and that any state legislation which interfered with that market would be considered a heavy burden on interstate commerce.30 9 Under this approach, takeover legislation which
tended to entrench managers would fall under a Commerce Clause
balancing analysis unless the legislating state could prove that its
legislation furthered significant state interests.
There are, however, two potential problems with using such an
approach, one practical and one theoretical. On the practical side,
there is the simple fact that the CTS Court appears to have rejected
MITE's broad construction of the Commerce Clause. Under the
logic of CTS, it would seem that states may freely burden the market for corporate control as long as that interference does not discriminate against interstate commerce.310
On the theoretical side, the question is not whether the CTS or
the MITE analysis is correct, but whether courts should engage in
an interest balancing approach at all. Many scholars, for instance,
have suggested that such balancing of interests is a purely legislative
function, for which courts are ill-suited, and that judicial scrutiny of
state law under the Commerce Clause should therefore be restricted
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See
See
457
See
See

supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
supra notes 187-225 and accompanying text.
U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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to policing for purposeful economic protectionism.3 11
Without trying to resolve this academic debate, it can at least
be noted that, in the context of state takeover regulation, a broader
judicial role in Commerce Clause analysis can help to compensate
for a failure of the legislative process which may be as likely to occur on the federal level as on the state level. Specifically, the very
mechanism which causes the market for corporate charters to promote management and not shareholder interests-that shareholders
are too disorganized and dispersed to adequately defend their rights
in either the internal corporate governance structure or in state legislatures-is just as likely to be a problem on the federal level."12
Courts, being free from management lobbying pressures, could thus
serve a valuable role through the use of a balancing analysis, to correct for this deficiency in the legislative process. 313
CONCLUSION

One of the perennial issues looming behind all of corporate law
is the extent to which such law should be "federalized." This Article
has attempted to shed light on that issue through an examination of
311. See, e.g., Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 47 (1981); Regan, supra note 17; Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An
Analysis in Terms of ConstitutionalStructure, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 885 (1985). See generally
Regan, supra note 17 (citing other sholars advocating this position). Justice Scalia also advocated this position in his concurrence in CTS. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69, 94-95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
312. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 921-23 (arguing that "[t]here is no reason to believe,
and every reason to doubt, that the elimination of the market for corporate charters will increase shareholders' welfare."); Romano, State Competition, supra note 9, at 712-13 (suggesting that there is no reason to think that "diffuse and unorganized" shareholders would be
any more capable of communicating their views to Congress than to state legislatures).
313. Scholars have described two alternative theories for justifying judicial intervention
under the Commerce Clause. Under one theory, judicial intervention should be limited to correcting for failures in the legislative process. See Eule, supra note 135, at 438. Judicial invalidation of protectionist legislation is the prime example, since, as mentioned earlier, in that
situation the parties adversely affected by the legislation are by definition outside the legislating state and thus have no legislative recourse. See supra notes 159, 185 and accompanying
text.
Under the second theory, judicial intervention is thought appropriate to preserve fundamental values inherent in our system. See Eule, supra note 13, at 438-40. In the Commerce
Clause context, this value-oriented approach is reflected by the Court's striking of legislation
which interferes with the fundamental value of free trade. The MITE decision would appear to
reflect this latter approach.
The striking of management entrenchment takeover legislation might not only be appropriate on a value-oriented approach, as was used in MITE, but also from a process approach,
since there is likely to be a legislative failure at all levels of governance.
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what one area of state corporate lawmaking-state takeover statutes---can teach about state competence to make corporate law.
The examination has shown that all is not well in state corporate lawmaking, at least in the takeover context. Some states are
abusing their corporate lawmaking powers to enact protectionist legislation; others to enact management entrenchment legislation. Nevertheless, having isolated the motivations underlying this legislation,
the Article has hopefully been able to prescribe a coherent and comprehensive federal response.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss3/2

64

